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Abstract
This dissertation discusses the role of social network and labor market regula-
tion in understanding racial and gender inequality. The first chapter contributes to the
discussion on childhood exposure by investigating the extent to which the educational
background of peers’ parents is related to a child’s future college attainment. I analyze
the friendship networks of a nationally representative sample of high-school students
in the US and find that the spillover from peers’ parents of the same gender operates
independently of peers’ academic performance. The effects are robust in addressing
friendship selection. The same gender pattern suggests either the transmission of
gender identity or the presence of a role model effect. Furthermore, the same gender
spillover is significant only for students from lower-educated families. A student whose
father is absent or less caring also experiences significant influence from peers’ fathers.
The heterogeneity by own family background indicates the influences from parental
and non-parental adults are substitutes. The second and third chapter examines the
effect of occupational licensing on wage and employment. If the source of racial and
gender wage gap is statistical discrimination, licensed minority and females should
receive higher license premium since licensing provides information on workers’ pro-
ductivity to the labor market. The result of the second chapter shows that licensing
provides signals on the non-felon status and completely closes the racial wage gap
between black men and white men; licensing reduces the gender wage gap but the
ii
gender disparity on wages still persists among licensed workers. In the third chapter,
I exploit state variation in licensing laws to study the effect of licensing on occupa-
tional choice using a boundary discontinuity design. I find that licensing reduces the
equilibrium labor supply by an average of 17%-27%. The negative labor supply effects
of licensing appear to be strongest for white workers and comparatively weaker for
black workers.
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Chapter 1
Peers’ Parents And Educational
Attainment: The Exposure Effect
This paper contributes to the discussion on childhood exposure by investigating
the extent to which the educational background of peers’ parents is related to a child’s
future college attainment. In the literature, the importance of parents and peers
are known, but they are considered separately. In the context of social network
where individuals are either directly or indirectly connected with each other, peers’
parents also matter in affecting child development through the spread of information
or presenting as role models, and both effects can be influential to disadvantaged
students.1 The main contribution of this paper is to empirically show the importance
1There are at least three reasons to believe that peers’ parents can affect the educational outcomes
of a child. First, there exists a direct influence among peers (Sacerdote, 2001). Children learn from
their own parents to behave in certain ways and create pressure to conform among their peers. Second,
parents communicate the benefits of educational achievement to their child’s friends either directly
through interaction or indirectly through the social network (Granovetter, 1973, 1983; Jackson, 2010).
The theory about the spread of information among social ties is also well-supported by empirical
work on criminal activity (Patacchini and Zenou, 2008), job search (Wahba and Zenou, 2005), career
choice (Tu¨men, 2017), and the drop-out decision of high-school students (Coleman, 1988). Third,
young people make choices based on the outcomes realized by a set of ‘role models’ (Manski, 1993a).
Bisin and Verdier (2001) construct a similar theoretical framework that cultural transmission works
through horizontal (oblique) socialization by non-parental adults.
1
of peers’ background. Whereas the primary focus of applied social network analysis in
education literature is the contemporaneous spillover of academic performance, this
paper shows that the ‘peer effect’ is not exhaustive in explaining social influence.
To measure the influence of peers’ parents on the educational decision of a
child, I investigate the extent to which the educational background of peers’ parents
is related to a child’s college attainment. I analyze the National Longitudinal Survey
of Adolescent Health (AddHealth) dataset which covers a nationally representative
sample of high-school students in the US. In addition to standard demographic charac-
teristics, it also contains the details of friendship networks in the same school and the
educational background of parents. I find evidence that the educational background of
peers’ parents does influence a child’s college attainment. Moreover, the mechanisms
are based on the gender of both peers’ parents and the child. Whereas the inclusion of
peers’ observed characteristics (including academic performance) and neighborhood
characteristics negate the effects of peers’ parents of the opposite gender, the spillover
from peers’ parents of the same gender remains robust.
The magnitude of the same gender spillover is also comparable to the influence
from stronger social ties. On average, having a peer’s parent of the same gender who
graduates from college increases the likelihood of completing college for boys and girls
by 2.36 and 1.58 percentage points respectively. The same gender spillover on boys
is one-third the magnitude of the effect of having a father who is a college graduate,
whereas the same gender spillover on girls is one-sixth the magnitude of the effect of
having a mother who is a college graduate. The same-gender influences on both boys
and girls are also comparable to one-half the effect from a one standard deviation
increase in average GPA of peers.
I also find evidence that influences from parental and non-parental adults are
substitutes. First, the same-gender spillover is only significant when neither or only
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one of the parents graduated from college. Second, students whose father is absent
also experience significant spillover from peers’ fathers.2 Third, the same gender
spillover on males diminishes with the intimacy with own father. Changing from
having the least caring to the most caring father completely offsets the same gender
spillover on males. When own parents are lower-educated, less caring, or even absent,
the influences from well-educated non-parental adults become more important (Bisin
and Verdier, 2001).
One might worry that students do not choose their friends randomly and the
positive sorting among students could explain the results that I document. To address
selection due to unobserved heterogeneity, I estimate a selection-corrected model that
characterizes the network formation process based on homophily (individual bonding
based on similarity) (Hsieh and Lee, 2016; Hsieh and Lin, 2017). This approach
treats the selection problem as omitted variable bias and combines the spirits of
the Heckman two-step procedure (Heckman, 1976, 1979) and the control function
approach.3 The same-gender effects remain robust to addressing friendship selection,
and the corrections in upward bias occur mainly in the effect of peers’ academic
performance.
There are two explanations for why the same gender spillover from peers’
parents operates independently of peers’ academic performance. First, there has
been empirical evidence on the positive impacts of having gender-specific adult role
models on education-related outcomes (Bettinger and Long, 2005; Dee, 2007; Griffith,
2014; Eble and Hu, 2017). The influence can involve human capital transfer, sharing
information or changing preference through direct contact (Chung, 2000). The role
2The coefficients are imprecise for students whose mothers are absent, possibly due to a small
sample size of this group.
3A variety of selection-corrected models of this kind have been adopted in recent applied social
network analysis (Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens, 2013; Chan and Lam, 2014; Griffith, 2017).
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model effect also reconciles the different results I find for own parents, that both
males and females experience a similar magnitude of the influence from own father
and mother, because one’s own parents can communicate the information or transfer
human capital through daily contact. Second, there may exist the spread of gender
identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2002). When students learn about the ‘ideal
behaviors’, they will have the pressure to conform.
My results are related to two policies. First, there have been empirical work
showing that school and neighborhood composition affect child development (Katz et
al., 2001; Hanushek et al., 2009; Chetty et al., 2016a). One important source of the
effect is the exposure to surrounding environments (Chetty et al., 2016b; Chyn, 2017;
Chetty and Hendren, 2018). With detailed information on friendship networks, this
paper is able to demonstrate that a social network is a crucial component in generating
the ‘exposure effect’. My paper also speaks to the literature on tracking (Garlick,
2018). To the extent that children form most of friendships based on their classmates,
grouping students by ability can have the unintended consequence of reducing the
spillover from peers’ parents on disadvantaged students. Therefore, there is a trade-off
between the peer effects induced by grade tracking and the indirect effects from peers’
parents. My work quantifies the latter to allow for sharper tracking policy that fully
accounts for this trade-off. More importantly, the null effect I find for students from
better-educated families suggests that mixing individuals from diverse background
may not be a zero-sum game.
1.1 Literature on Peer Effect and Peers’ Parent
The seminal work by Manski (1993b) pioneers the distinction between
contemporaneous spillover among peers and the effect of peers’ characteristics (con-
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textual effect). Subsequent research on social interaction attempt to identify the
contemporaneous spillover using econometric techniques (Lee, 2007; Bramoulle´ et al.,
2009; Lee et al., 2010; Lin, 2010), or random assignment of peers (Sacerdote, 2001;
Zimmerman, 2003).
This paper is more related to a few studies that look at contextual effects being
caused by the family background of peers. Without data on individual social network,
earlier attempts to estimate the spillover from peers’ parents assume students are
connected to and affected equally by everyone in the same network. Peers either
refer to classmates, grade-mates or schoolmates. For example, Ammermueller and
Pischke (2009) exploit random allocations of students into classes and find that the
number of books in classmates’ homes increases the reading test scores of 9- and
10-year-olds in six European countries. Black et al. (2013) analyze random variation
in peer composition across cohorts in Norweigan schools and find significant effects of
father’s earnings of grade-mates on male students. Olivetti et al. (2015) also analyze
the AddHealth data and find significant effects from the weekly hours worked by
mothers of grade-mates on labor force participation of females.4
Further research analyzing friendship networks in AddHealth data define the
educational background of peers’ parents differently, and therefore find mixed results.
For example, Hsieh and Lee (2016) and Hsieh and Lin (2017) estimate spillovers among
peers. They include only the education and job status of peers’ mothers as control
variables and find insignificant effects. In contrast, Patacchini and Zenou (2016)
investigate the effects from having same-race friends. They control for education
status of either peers’ fathers or peers’ mothers, depending on the interviewee in the
survey, and find positive effects.
This paper complements the studies in three aspects. First, I examine the
4In their robustness section, they also analyze the friendship networks and find a similar result.
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friendship networks. Instead of assuming a completed network, students have their
own peer groups in the same network. Second, I differentiate the effects of peers’
fathers from that of peers’ mother. Third, I also relax the assumption that the
spillover from peers’ parents on educational outcome is the same for male and female
students.
1.2 Methodology
1.2.1 AddHealth Data
The key to study social networks empirically is to identify how individuals are
connected. The restricted version of the AddHealth dataset ideally suites the purpose
of this paper because it is a unique database on high-school friendship networks in
addition to standard demographic details. It is a longitudinal study made up of
students in grades 7-12 in the United States from a nationally representative sample
of schools starting from the 1994-95 school year.5 In the first wave, 90,118 students in
the Core sample from 132 schools participated in the In-School questionnaire. In this
survey, each student is asked to nominate up to five male and five female friends in
the school. Therefore, it is not necessary to assume equal influence across all members
in a student’s network. In the subsequent waves, the friendship networks among
tracked students are also recorded. However, as Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011)
point out, truncated networks may result in biased estimates. In order to preserve the
network structure, the friendship networks are based on the records in the In-School
questionnaire because only a subset of the students is sampled in the subsequent
surveys. In the main analysis, a friendship link is defined as directed without the need
5The survey is still ongoing with subsequent waves in 1996 (Wave II), 2001 and 2002 (Wave III),
2008 (Wave IV), and 2016 to 2018 (Wave V).
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of consensus. In Section 3.4, this assumption is re-examined. A network is defined as
a school.
The main outcome of interest is a dichotomous variable indicating ‘college
completion’ status. Because of the longitudinal nature of AddHealth, I can take a
closer look on the long-term effects of social network on human capital accumulation.
The survey follows up the socioeconomic circumstances of 10,258 randomly chosen
students from the Core sample in 2008 (Wave IV).6 While the literature on contem-
poraneous effects using this dataset is extensive, only a few studies pay attention to
long-term outcomes (Olivetti et al., 2015; Patacchini et al., 2017).
Following the literature, networks which are too small (< 11 students) and too
big (> 400 students) are not included in the main analysis.7 Students with no friend
nominations are dropped. In total, 28% of the observations in the original sample
are discarded. Table A1 shows that the summary statistics of the variables in the
data. Indeed, the mean sample characteristics do not change in a meaningful way
with the two selection criterion. For example, about 35% of the sampled students
completed college and male-female ratio remains 50-50 throughout. The final sample
consists of 7,399 students from 116 networks (schools). On average, each student has
approximately five friends.
Two sets of variables are important to disentangle the mechanisms through
which the spillover from indirect social ties operate. First, direct peer effects are
measured by the peers’ characteristics including age, race, gender, as well as GPA
which is the average of English, Mathematics, History and Science. Second, the
6There are total 12,105 students drawn from the Core sample. However, some of them do not
complete the In-school questionnaire.
7The lower bound is set based on the survey design (Hsieh and Lee, 2016), whereas the upper
bound is set based on the speed of convergence of the selection-corrected model. Calvo´-Armengol
et al. (2009) also provide theoretical arguments on excluding networks with extreme size. To check
sensitivity, the estimation of simple Probit with all networks in Column (2) of Table A1 indeed gives
the same qualitative results. For clarity, results are available upon request.
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variables listed under ‘Family and community characteristics’ in Table A1 are used
to proxy for the choice of parents. These variables can capture their choices on
neighborhood and schools that cannot be addressed by network fixed effects.
To measure the influence from friends’ parents, I use the unique identifier of
each student and match the characteristics of friends. In particular, family spillover
is measured by the education background of friends’ parents – college attainment of
father and mother of friends. Table A2 compares the raw relationship between the
characteristics of peers’ parents and college completion status of students. For both
male and female students with college degrees, their friends’ parents whom they met
during Grade 7 to 12 tend to be better educated. For example, in the first row, only
21% of their peers’ fathers went to college for males without a degree, compared to
39% for males with a degree. The difference between two is also statistically significant.
This pattern applies also the average college attainment of peers’ mothers. Although
there is a positive relationship between the educational background of peers’ parents
and college completion of a student, the selection issue is still a concern in causal
inference. Also, students benefit from peers’ family background may simply be due to
the interactions with better peers. The next two sections discuss the causal estimation
and the isolation of peer effects in details.
1.2.2 Sociomatrix and Baseline Model
To formalize the idea of social interactions in the estimation, a sociomatrix for
each network (school) is employed. Define ns be the number of students in network s,
and thus the sociomatrix (Ds) is a ns-by-ns square matrix in which the rows represent
the students and columns represent their potential friends in the network. Each
entry of Ds is a dummy indicator dij,s equals 1 if i nominates j as friend. Under the
8
assumption that friendship links are directed without consensus, Ds is asymmetric.
To examine separate effects by gender, Ds is multiplied element-wise by the male
and female indicators to generate two separate sociomatrices, Dmales and D
female
s .
8 A
baseline model to estimate the influence from peers’ parents is to regress the outcome
variable on the average characteristics of peers’ parents. Formally, define Wmaleg and
W femaleg as the row-normalized sociomatrices to obtain the average characteristics. For
student i in grade g in network s, the probability of college attainment is expressed
as:
Pr(Yisg = 1) = Φ{βmale,FATHERWmales FATHERs+βmale,MOTHERWmales MOTHERs
βfemale,FATHERW
female
s FATHERs + βfemale,MOTHERW
female
s MOTHERs
+WsXsδ +Xisgφ+ αg + αs} (1.1)
where an underlying residual uisg follows a standard normal distribution. FATHERjs
and MOTHERjs are vectors of indicators equals 1 if j’s father/mother graduates
from college. Together with the row-normalized sociomatrices, the first four terms
measure the proportion of i’s peers’ fathers/mothers who are college graduates with
separate effects on male and female students. For example, βmale,FATHER is the effects
on male students from having more peers’ fathers who are college graduates. Xisg is
a vector of i’s characteristics which are shown in Table A1. Especially, controlling
for family and community characteristics help alleviate the concern that families
select neighborhoods. αg and αs refer to grade and school fixed effects. The average
8The operation can be interpreted as dividing Ds into two row segments by gender where
Ds =
(
D˜males
D˜females
)
which is similar to Hsieh and Lin (2017) that the sociomatrix is divided by blocks.
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characteristics of peers WsXjs (GPA, race, gender, age, and single parent indicator)
are added to isolate β from the effects of peers’ quality. Because the number of friends
varies, out-degree is also included as a control variable.
Using the terminology by Manski (1993b), the coefficients of interest (β)
in Equation 1.1 are the estimates of contextual effects, i.e. the effects of the pre-
determined characteristics of peers. Since the focus of this paper is not the spillover
among peers, the average GPA of peers is contained in WsXjs and enters the regression
as a control variable instead of being the main variable of interest. This also gives
β the interpretation of the spillover from peers’ parents that operates independently
of the direct peer effects. One alternative to isolate the influences of peers’ parents
from peers is controlling for the average college attainment rate of peers (Patacchini
et al., 2017). However, as discussed in the data section, only a subset of students in
the friendship network in Wave I is traced through Wave IV. To preserve the network
structure, average GPA of peers is a reasonable substitute.
1.2.3 Selection-Corrected Model
The identification of β in Equation 1.1 relies on the independence of the
sociomatrix Ds (more specifically the dij,s entries) and uisg. However, this does not
hold in many circumstances as relationship sorting is well-documented (Jackson, 2010;
Carrell et al., 2013). Although including network fixed effects and controlling for
family backgrounds can mitigate the problem from neighborhood sorting, the list of
control variables can hardly be exhaustive in dealing with relationship sorting based
on unobserved characteristics within a network (Manski, 1993b; Bramoulle´ et al.,
2009). In this paper, the selection issue is handled as omitted variable bias. That is,
Equation 1.1 fails to incorporate common factors that simultaneously determine the
10
outcome and link decisions.
To formalize this strategy, I first characterize friendship formation using the
latent space model (Hoff et al., 2002). This model of endogenous link formation
is based on a social phenomenon called ‘homophily’, a term is coined in Lazarsfeld
et al. (1954). In models of homophily, two agents are more likely to have a tie if
they share similar characteristics. These shared traits can be observed characteristics
such as gender and age, or unobserved traits such as personality. The distances of
the characteristics between two agents will be the key explanatory variables in the
endogenous friendship formation.
The outcome variable in this model, dij,s, equals 1 if i sends a link to j in
a network, and the network model is in a logit form.9 The probability of each link
equals 0 or 1 is:
Pr(dij,s|ψij,s) =
(
1
1 + exp(−ψij,s)
)dij,s ( exp(−ψij,s)
1 + exp(−ψij,s)
)1−dij,s
(1.2)
where
ψij,s = γ0 + γ1Xi,s + γ2Xj,s
+ γ3|agei,s − agej,s|+ γ4|genderi,s − genderj,s|+ γ5|gradei,s − gradej,s|
+
d¯∑
k=1
γk|eik,s − ejk,s|
The above structural specification closely follows that of (Hsieh and Lee, 2016; Hsieh
and Lin, 2017). Xi and Xj contain i’s and j’s age respectively. The dyad-specific
(absolute distance of gender, age and grade) observed characteristics explain the link
decision based on homophily and serve as exclusion restrictions. eik,s refers to the
9Another possible parametric assumption is using a probit link (Chan and Lam, 2014).
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k-th unobserved latent factor (such as attitude or habit) that matters in the link
decision, and d¯ represents the dimension of the latent factors which represent different
unobserved traits. |eik,s − ejk,s| refers to the absolute distance of the latent factor
between i and j. γk and the coefficients of the dyad-specific variables are expected to
be negative based on the idea of homophily. The key of this model is the vector of
d¯-dimensional latent factors ξi,s = (ei1,s, ....., eid¯,s) which provides a linkage between
network formations and the outcome equation.
To incorporate the latent factors from link formations which are not observed,
the outcome equation in Equation 1.1 is augmented using the approach of Albert and
Chib (1993). Assume y∗isg represents the latent variable underlying the decision of
college attainment. The augmented version of Equation 1.1 becomes:
Yisg =

1 if y∗isg > 0
0 if y∗isg ≤ 0
y∗isg = βmale,FATHERW
male
s FATHERs + βmale,MOTHERW
male
s MOTHERs
βfemale,FATHERW
female
s FATHERs + βfemale,MOTHERW
female
s MOTHERs
+WsXsδ +Xisgφ+ αg + αs +
d¯∑
k=1
ρkeik,sg + isg (1.3)
and isg follows standard normal distribution. The breakdown of uisg in Equation 1.1
into
∑d¯
k=1 ρkeik,sg + isg requires the parametric assumptions that E[uisg|ξi,s] being
linear in ξi,s.
10 The d¯-dimensional latent factors enter Equation 1.3 as control functions,
10Similar to the Heckman selection model, u and ξ follow a joint normal distribution (Hsieh and
Lee, 2016). However, only E[uisg|ξi,s] being linear in ξi,s is a necessary assumption to identify the
model (Olsen, 1980).
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and thus the sociomatrices are conditionally independent of isg. The intuition is that
if the similarity in unobserved attributes, such as beliefs and habits, significantly
affect whether i and j bond together, and if these attributes significantly determine
the outcome (ρ > 0), failure to account for it could result in biased estimates of β.
One important issue regarding identification. Without excluded variables in ψij,s in
Equation 1.2, the identification of β relies on the non-linearity of ei,s, and this can cause
imprecise estimates (Brock and Durlauf, 2003). Therefore, dyad-specific characteristics
in Equation 1.2 are used as exclusion restrictions. The assumption is that similarities
in observed characteristics, controlling for the characteristics in the outcome equation,
only affect the outcome y∗isg through changing the likelihood of forming the link. The
threat to this identifying assumption is that the characteristics are determined after
friendships being formed such as common club activities.11 Therefore, the observed
characteristics are all pre-determined.12
In the above structural model from Equation 1.2 and Equation 1.3, there
are four sets of parameters: outcome parameters (θ = {β, δ, φ, αg}), network fixed
effects (αs), link formation parameters (γ), and the error-correction terms (ρ). For
illustration purpose, define Θ = {θ, γ,Γ, ρ}, and Z be the variables in the first stage.
For each school, the joint likelihood function of Y ∗s = {y∗isg, ..., y∗nssg} and Ds for the
estimation is:
L(Y ∗s , Ds|Xs, Zs, ξs; Θ) =
∫
ξs
P (Y ∗s , Ds|Xs, Zs, ξs; Θ)f(ξs)dξs
=
∫
ξs
P (Y ∗s |Ds, Xs, ξs; Θ, αs)P (Ds|Zs, ξs; Θ)f(ξs)dξs (1.4)
11Chan and Lam (2014) demonstrated the use of pre-determined common hobby as the exclusion
restriction.
12Notice that although the model in this paper essentially follows Hsieh and Lee (2016), the
indicator ‘same race’ is not included as this correlates strongly with socioeconomic status.
13
where P (Ds|Zs, ξs) =
∏ns
i
∏ns
j 6=i Pr(dij,s|Zi,j,s, ξi,s) under the assumption that each link
is formed independently conditional on Zi,j,s and ξi,s. An obvious way to obtain the
estimates is to apply Maximum Likelihood to Equation 11. However, with the presence
of the unobserved latent factors ξi,s, there is no closed-form solutions. To circumvent
this difficulty, I estimate link formations and the selection-corrected outcome equation
simultaneously using Bayesian method (mixing Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) and Gibbs
sampler).13 Details of MCMC algorithm are described in Appendix B. The part that
deals with the unobservables, however, is worth further explanations. In each iteration,
ξi are drawn randomly from a prior distribution and the M-H algorithm is used to
decide whether the draw should be updated. This procedure allows researchers to
treat the latent factors as if they are known. The chosen draw is then used to update
the rest of the parameters.
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) are among the first to implement
this selection-correction approach to look at spillover among peers in recreational
activities using a binary latent factor, but finding ρ insignificant in their case. Hsieh
and Lee (2016) and Hsieh and Lin (2017) allow the latent factors to be continuous
and multidimensional. They show that upon including sufficient dimensions, selection
based on homophily can be solved. To determine the optimal dimension of latent
factors, I follow their approach to use Akaike’s information criterion for Monte Carlo
(AICM) introduced by Raftery et al. (2007) for Bayesian model selections.
Besides the parametric assumptions, the defect of the aforementioned ap-
proach is computational burden. An alternative approach to address selection bias
in non-experimental analysis is to instrument for the average characteristics of peers
Bramoulle´ et al. (2009).14 However, link formations (and thus the adjacency matrix)
13As noted by Hsieh and Lee (2016), this approach is essentially full information maximum
likelihood.
14Sacerdote (2001) and Zimmerman (2003) are two seminal works that exploit random assignments
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are still assumed to be independent of individual choices. Also, monotonicity assump-
tion in IV estimation may be violated when behavioral responses of group sorting are
taken into account (Echenique and Fryer, 2007).
1.3 Results
1.3.1 The Role of Peer Effects and Parental Choice
First, I estimate a simple probit model (without the network formation model)
and check out the role of direct peer effects and the choice by parents on neighborhood
in explaining the spillover from peers’ parents.
Following previous studies that also analyze AddHealth data, I first present the
results of homogeneous effects which are the pooled estimates of the effects on both
male and female students. In Column (1) of Table A3, without any control variable,
there exist a strong and positive relationship between the average college attainment
of peers’ parents and the college attainment of a student. This is the pure correlation
observed in the summary statistics in Table A2. An interesting observation is that
the size of the effects from friends’ fathers are twice as large as that from friends’
mothers even though both are estimated with similar precision. The difference is also
statistically significant (f-stat equals 15.19). The inclusion of own characteristics (GPA,
age, race, and gender) does not cause a substantial change in the magnitude as shown
in Column (2). However, when own family background, neighborhood characteristics,
and fixed effects are included, the size of the estimates for peers’ fathers and peers’
mothers are reduced by 50% and 67% as shown from Column (3) to (5).15 This shows
of peers. Even in these circumstances, interactions still depend on agents’ choices.
15A small amount of observations drops out when fixed effects are added due to the incidental
parameters problem in non-linear models. This can be circumvented when I estimate the selection-
corrected model in Section1.3.2 because a continuous latent variable is assumed Albert and Chib
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the importance of sorting based on socioeconomic status. In Column (6), I estimate
the fully saturated model that takes direct peer effects into account by including peer
characteristics (including GPA, race, gender, age and single parent status). Both the
effects from friends’ fathers and friends’ mothers are further reduced by 41% and 37%,
and only the former remains statistically significant. Throughout the exercise, the
size of the influence from peers’ fathers is mostly statistically larger than that from
peers mothers, and the difference is explained away by direct peer effects.
The above estimates of the average effects across gender are consistent with the
findings in previous studies which also analyze AddHealth data. Hsieh and Lee (2016)
treat the family background of friends as control variables using ‘the proportion
of friends’ mothers who graduate from high-school’ and the proportion of friends’
mothers who work as professionals’, and find insignificant effects.16 Patacchini and
Zenou (2016) indeed find significant and positive effects from parental education of
friends. However, they define ‘parent’ as the interviewee in the In-Home survey and
therefore can either be father or mother. Therefore, their estimate is essentially mixing
the effects from friends’ fathers and friends’ mothers.
I repeat the exercise above to examine the role of direct peer effects and parents’
choices on neighborhood in explaining the heterogeneous effects across gender from
peers’ parents in Table A4. In Column (1), without control variables, the size of
the effects for both same-gender and opposite-gender spillover are large and positive.
Same as the homogeneous above, the influence from peers’ fathers is larger than that
from peers’ mothers. However, the gender-specific pattern on males starts to emerge
because only the difference on male students are statistically significant (f-stat: 21.66,
as opposed to 2.03 for female students). Again, adding own characteristics as shown
(1993).
16They use high-school graduation status (HS) as cutoff, and include “less than HS” and “more
than HS”. The estimate of “more than HS” is essentially close to zero.
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in Column (2) does not significantly alter the four estimates. In Column (3), we
start to see the role of sorting based on socioeconomic status. Once controlling for
own family background, the most affected variable is the opposite-gender spillover on
males in which the magnitude drops by more than one-half and it becomes statistically
insignificant. Although the size of same-gender spillover (for both male and female)
and the effects from peers’ fathers on females become smaller, the magnitudes remain
statistically significant. This qualitative pattern remains the same when neighborhood
characteristics and fixed effects are added in Column (4) and (5). When direct peer
effects are included in Column (6), the effect from peers’ fathers on females drops
by 59% and becomes insignificant. The same-gender spillovers for male and female
students also decrease by 29% and 15%, but they remain statistically significant.
The decomposition exercise tells the importance of direct peer effects and the
choice of parents. In particular, comparing the fully-saturated model in Column (6)
and the simple model in Column (2) of Table A4, the two factors explain about half of
the same-gender spillover and completely explain away the opposite-gender spillover.
What remain statistically significant, after considering peer effects and parents’ choices,
are the same-gender spillover and the difference of the effects between peers’ fathers
and peers’ mothers on male students.
Table A5 compares the marginal effects from peers, peers’ parents, and own
parents. To adjust the unit of comparison, the magnitudes from peers’ parents are
adjusted by a factor of 5 as the average number of friends in the sample is 4.85. For
male students, the effects from having one more peers’ father with college degree
are one-third of the effects from own parents. For female students, the effects from
having one more peers’ mother with college degree are one-sixth of the effects from
own parents. The second panel shows the marginal effects for average GPA of peers.
The influences from peers’ parents of same-gender are comparable to half of the effects
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from an increase in a one standard deviation in average peers’ GPA.
1.3.2 Selection-Correction
In the fully-saturated model above, friendship formation is assumed to be
exogenous. To address the selection issues, I estimate the network formation model
(Equation 1.2) and the outcome (Equation 1.3) jointly. Following Hsieh and Lee
(2016), I run 150,000 iterations with the first 40,000 as burn-in. The point estimates
reported in Table 3.5 are the mean of the 110,000 posterior draws and hypothesis
testing follows frequentist’s approach. Convergence is confirmed by Geweke (1992)’s
method. The chain values and histograms are presented in Appendix C.
For consistency, I still present the result using Bayesian method for the fully-
saturated model to obtain AICM in Column (1) of Table 3.5. The estimates are
essentially the same as that using classical approach in Table A4. From Column (2)
to (4), I estimate the selection-corrected model by increasing the dimensions of error
correction terms. This exercise is the same as adding more measures of unobserved
ability and search the best fit. The first stage results are presented in the second panel
which confirm the hypothesis of homophily that two students are less likely to be
friends if their pre-determined characteristics are different from each other. According
to AICM, the model with two-dimensional latent factors in Column (3) of Table 3.5
provides the best goodness-of-fit. This result is consistent with the estimation by Hsieh
and Lee (2016) in which they also have the best fit of the endogenous friendship model
when two-dimensional latent factors are included. The four variables decrease only a
little when compared to that in Column (1) and the gender-specific pattern remains
robust. Also, the drop in the magnitudes is not statistically significant. However, this
does not mean the selection-correction method does not function well. I also present
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the coefficient for the average GPA of peers. Compared to the estimate in Column (1),
the magnitude in Column (3) drops by more than one-third of the standard deviation
of the posterior draws.
1.4 Further Analysis
1.4.1 Robustness Check
In this section, I check the sensitivity of the above results by varying the
definition of friendships. In the main analysis, a link is directed without consensus.
That is, the sample pools both reciprocal and non-reciprocal links. The defect of
including non-reciprocal links is that interaction may be less close. However, when
non-reciprocal links are taken away, there are 6,738 observations remain with only 40%
of the links preserved. Therefore, there are concerns for measurement errors in both
methods. Including non-reciprocal friendships may fail to reject false links, whereas
omitting them may drop the true links. When the inaccuracies are due to random
factors such as the survey design, the measurement error is classical which induces
attenuation bias. The same gender estimates will be the lower bounds of the true
effect, while the opposite-gender spillover may be falsely rejected. In contrast, when
the inaccuracies are systematically correspond to the characteristics of respondents,
for example smarter students are more honest on their relationships, the estimates of
peer effects will then be biased.
To strike the balance in defining friendship, I adopt flexible weighting for non-
reciprocal links. That is, I define a weighting factor α varying from 0 to 1. When
α approaches 0, less weights are assigned to non-reciprocal links. When α = 0, all
links are reciprocal friendships, whereas α = 1 resembles the weight used in the main
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analysis where reciprocal and non-reciprocal friends are equally weighted. On one
hand, I could preserve the links that are reported. On the other hand, we could track
the changes of the results when the weight varies. The four plots in Figure A1 show
the changes of the main coefficients when adjusting the weight (α) on non-reciprocal
friendships. The estimates are indeed stable across the weighting methods. One
exception is the coefficient of the effects of peers’ father on males (Top-left panel).
When only reciprocal links are counted (α = 0), the spillover become small and
insignificant. One explanation is that we lose important information when dropping
the non-reciprocal links.
1.4.2 Substitution Between Parental and Non-Parental Adults
Whereas I find gender-specific spillover from friends’ parents, in Table A5 of
Section 2.3, I show that the influences from own parents are gender-neutral. That
is, both mother and father exert significant impacts on their children, regardless of
whether they are boys or girls. A natural question to ask is: are the influences from
peers’ parents the same for students from different family backgrounds? The richness
of the survey enables me to separate the students into six different categories: families
with the presence of both parents are grouped according to whether both, either,
or none of the parents are college graduates; together with single father households,
single mother households, and households with the absence of both parents.17
In Table A7, the effects on students across the six family status are reported.
The estimation is done by interacting the four variables of interest with indicators
of the six family status in one regression to capture the heterogeneous impacts. A
17To determine whether the parents are absent, I make use of the two questions: “Do you live
with your biological mother, stepmother, foster mother, or adoptive mother?” and “Do you live with
your biological father, stepfather, foster father, or adoptive father?”. The number of observations of
each group is: Both college (1,237); Either college (1,291); Neither college (2,925); Single FATHER
(224); Single MOTHER (1,428); Both absence (294).
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linear probability model is employed for the sake of interpretation. For the same-
gender spillover on male students, the effects concentrate on students who come from
two-parent families with one or none of them graduates from college. Conditional on
having 5 friends (the sample average), having one college-grad peers’ father increases
the likelihood of completing college by 4.1 and 3.3 percentage points which are higher
than the average normalized magnitudes in Table A5. The effect on students from a
single-mother family is slightly smaller and is marginally significant. For the same-
gender spillover on females, the effect is significant for females only if one of their
parents completed college. Again, conditional on having 5 friends, having one college-
grad peers’ mother increases the likelihood of completing college by 4.4 percentage
points for this category of girls.
Two observations may suggest that influences from parental and non-parental
adults are substitutes. First, peers’ fathers are influential on students from single-
mother family. Especially for female students, this is the only family category that
I find significant opposite-gender spillover, and the size of the effect is significantly
different from that on students from a two-parent family. Second, students from
well-educated families (both parents are college grads) do not experience significant
effects from peers’ parents, regardless of their gender. The size of the effect is smaller
than those found in lower-educated households, although the difference in magnitudes
is not statistically significant.
To test the hypothesis that there exists substitution between parental and non-
parental adults, I further look at whether the magnitude of the spillover from peers’
parents diminishes with the intimacy with own parents. AddHealth provides a unique
opportunity to explore this question. In the In-Home survey of Wave I, students are
asked about the relationship with their fathers and mothers. From 1 (not at all) to 5
(very much), students give a rating on how close do they feel to their mother/father
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and how much do they think she/he cares about them. Altogether there are four
responses – two on mother and two on father. I then construct three care indexes using
factor analysis: ‘Care from both’ using all the four responses, ‘Care from mother’,
and ‘Care from father’. The analysis is constrained to two-parent families because
the questions are skipped for students from single-parent families. The first four rows
of Table A8 show the summary statistics for the four survey questions. Students
usually have a higher rating on mothers than on fathers. The second panel shows the
summary statistics for the three care indexes.
To implement the analysis, I interact the care indexes with the four variables of
interest. The results are reported in Table A9. In Column 1, except the interaction on
the effect of peers’ mothers on males, all the other three interaction terms are negative
as expected. That is, the more care a child receives from own parents, the less spillover
he or she experiences from peers’ parents. The one that is statistically significant is the
interaction term on the same gender spillover of males. More surprisingly, changing
from having the least caring to the most caring parents completely offsets the spillover
on males (the index increases from -2.44 to 0.91 as shown by the min and max in
Table A8). I further analyze the care indexes specifically on mother and father in
Column 2 and 3 respectively. In Column 2, as reflected by the interaction terms, the
care from mother does reduce the same gender spillover on both males and females.
However, the effect is not significant. What drives the reduction in the spillover in
Column 1 is the care from the father as shown in Column 3. Again, changing from
having the least caring to the most caring father (the index increases from -1.48 to
0.82) completely offset the positive same gender spillover on males.
The exercises in this subsection do suggest that the influences from parental
and non-parental adults are substitutes. Moreover, the presence of or the care from
the father is crucial in affecting the magnitude of the spillover from peers’ parents.
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1.4.3 Other Outcomes
Hsieh and Lin (2017) estimated the effects of peers’ parents for other short-term
outcomes. They find the educational background of peers’ mothers has marginally
significant effects (at 10% level) on GPA and no effects on smoking behaviors. My
result may differ because of their assumption that the effects of peers’ parents are
homogeneous across gender. To compare my finding with theirs, the same specification
in the main analysis, namely differentiating heterogeneous influences from peers’
parents by gender, is adopted to analyze the effects on GPA and smoking behaviors.
The results are presented from Column (1) to (4) of Table A11.
Column (1) presents the result with the assumption of homogeneous effects
across boys and girls. The effects of peers’ fathers and peers’ mothers on GPA are
one-half and one-fourth of a one standard deviation increases in the average GPA of
peers. While the effects of peers’ fathers are significant at 5% level, that of peers’
mothers are marginally significant at 10% level. This result is similar with Hsieh and
Lin (2017). Interestingly, there again exists a gender-specific pattern when I examine
heterogeneous impacts across gender in Column (2). Also, the difference between the
same-gender and opposite gender effects is statistically significant for male students.
These two patterns coincide with what I found for college attainment. The smoking
outcome does not exhibit the same pattern, however. Neither peers’ fathers nor peers’
mothers is influential in reducing smoking behaviors.
The above analysis may suggest that reducing incapacitating behaviors is not
a mechanism through which peers’ parents affect children. To check the sensitivity of
my analysis, in addition to smoking behaviors, I also include two other incapacitating
behaviors, namely drinking and dangerous behaviors.18 Not surprisingly, in Table A10,
18All the variables in this subsection are obtained in the In-School survey in Wave 1. ‘Smoke,
‘drunk’, and ‘danger’ are dummy variable obtained from the three questions “During the past twelve
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we do observe a strong correlation between GPA and college attainment that the
correlation coefficient equals 0.409. This can serve as a benchmark, and the correlation
between college attainment and the three incapacitating behaviors are relatively weak.
Therefore, regressing these behavioral outcomes on the average college attainment of
peers’ parents can test the hypothesis that behavioral change is one mechanism.
Column (5) to (8) of Table A11 show that neither peers’ fathers nor peers’
mothers is influential in reducing drinking and dangerous behaviors. However, this
does not mean social influence does not exist. Together with smoking outcome, all the
three incapacitating behaviors do exhibit significant spillover effects among peers. For
example, in Column (3), if all non-smoking peers smoke, an individual is on average
40% more likely to smoke.
The exercise here shows that the spillover from peers’ parents does show up
in both short-term and long-term educational outcomes. However, the effects do not
work through reducing incapacitating behaviors.
1.5 Discussion
Previous attempts to examine the effects of peers’ parents on students’ out-
comes find mixed results. For example, Hsieh and Lee (2016) and Hsieh and Lin
(2017) estimate spillovers among peers. They authors include the education and job
status of peers’ mothers as control variables and find insignificant effects on students’
GPA. In contrast, Patacchini and Zenou (2016) investigate the effects from having
same-race friends. They control for education status of either peers’ fathers or peers’
mothers, depending on who is the interviewee in the survey, and find positive effects.
To complement previous works on peers’ parents, this paper differentiates the effects
months, how often did you” separately on ‘smoking cigarettes’, ‘get drunk’, and ‘do something
dangerous because you were dared to’ in the In-School survey of AddHealth.
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of peers’ fathers from that of peers’ mother, and relaxes the assumption that the
spillover is the same for male and female students. When compared to the pooled esti-
mates across gender, I do find that the effects from peers’ parents of same-gender are
understated, whereas the effects from peers’ parents of opposite-gender are overstated.
1.5.1 Mechanisms
The same-gender and opposite-gender spillover from peers’ parents operate
through different channels. Parents’ choice and direct peer effects matter for the
opposite-gender effects. First, the significance of parents’ choice in determining a
student’s outcomes is well-documented. In affecting social networks which their
children belong to, parents choose neighborhood, school and peer groups that are best
suited to their children (Black, 1999b; Bayer et al., 2007a; Agostinelli, n.d.). Second,
peers affect each other (Manski, 1993b). As shown in Section 1.3.1, when the proxies
of parents’ choice and direct peer effects are included, the effects of peers’ parents of
the opposite gender are explained away.
Taking into accounts these factors, what remain unexplained can be attributed
to social influence. Interestingly, only the size of the same-gender spillover remains
large and significant. The spread of information about the ideal behaviors of a gender
group is a plausible reason. This resembles the analysis of Akerlof and Kranton (2000)
regarding how gender identity shapes behaviors. When social influence is taken into
account, an individual conforms to the ‘appropriate’ standards to avoid losing utility.
Indeed, the group ‘identity’ creates an extra cost in utility maximization in which the
cost is generated via the deviation from the ‘ideal’ behaviors (Akerlof and Kranton,
2002; Ghiglino and Goyal, 2010).
In the current context, the assimilation of the ‘ideal behaviors’ can go directly
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through interaction or indirectly via social networks. For direct influence from peers’
parents on a child, my result coincides with previous findings on the effect of role
models (Bettinger and Long, 2005; Dee, 2007; Griffith, 2014; Bosma et al., 2012).
They find that the presence of same gender role models has positive impacts on school
performance of a student. One explanation for why interaction only matters for the
same-gender pairs is that individuals of the same gender tend to engage in common
activities that result in more frequent contacts. This enhances the transmission
of influences through changing preferences, sharing information and human capital
transfer (Chung, 2000). This also explains the different results for own parents shown
in Table A5 because one’s own father and mother can affect their children via daily
contacts.
Even without direct interaction, the diffusion of beliefs and attitudes can work
through social networks. In a field experiment, Avvisati et al. (2013) randomly assign
parents to engage in parent-school meetings and learn how to help their children on
schoolwork. Not only students from the treated families show significant improvement
in attitudes and behaviors (such as truancy and work efforts), students from the
untreated families also show improvements if they are the classmates of the treated
students. In the current context, the unobserved factors affect male and female
students differently. As Chung (2000) suggests, information about the same social
group can be more precise about the benefits and costs of an action.
One concern to the above discussion is that contextual factors that are not
related to social influences may explain the spillover from peers’ parents. For example,
more-educated parents who are active in participating in school activities and teacher-
parent meetings exert influences on school policies, and thus benefit their child’s
classmates. Fruehwirth (2016) finds that the reading score of students improves
because teachers increase their unpaid preparation time and instruction hours when
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the parents of their students are more educated. However, contextual factors should
not generate the heterogeneity by gender and family background.
1.6 Conclusion
Social interactions affect our decisions and behaviors through imitation
of behaviors, the pressure to conform, or exposure to new information. This paper
takes a novel perspective by looking at the diffusion of influence from individuals
with indirect social ties. Indeed, the indirect ties in the current discussion, peers’
parents, can exert significant influences through inter-generational transmission. By
demonstrating the outcomes of certain actions, adults affect young people not only
directly through interactions, but also indirectly through transmitting information
via social networks.
In this paper, I find that the educational background of peers’ parents signifi-
cantly affects the college attainment of a child. My results show that peer effects and
the choice by parents on neighborhood are important in explaining the spillover from
peers’ parents. These two factors completely explain the effect of peers’ parents of
the opposite gender. In contrast, peers’ parents of the same gender exert influence
independent of the direct peer effect. This suggests either greater same gender inter-
actions that allow for the transmission of information, or contributes to the efficacy
of role model influence.
Exposure to educated adults in social networks can influence the educational
choice of a child. This evidence on the ‘exposure effect’ echos a recent work by Chetty
et al. (2018) who find a strong association of black boy’s future income with the
presence of black fathers at the census-tract level. Moreover, one way to promote
educational achievement of disadvantaged students may have to do with increasing
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exposure to educated adults. As I show in the paper, this is especially important for
children from single parent families who are most vulnerable.
My results also speak to the literature on tracking (Garlick, 2018). To the
extent that children for most of their friendships based on who are their classmates,
grouping students by ability can have the unintended consequence of reducing the
spillover from peers’ parents on disadvantaged students. Therefore, there is a trade-off
between the peer effects induced by grade tracking and the indirect effects from peers’
parents. My work quantifies the latter to allow for sharper tracking policy that fully
accounts for this trade-off. More importantly, the null effect I find for students from
better-educated families suggests that mixing individuals from diverse background
may not be a zero-sum game.
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Chapter 2
Occupational Licensing As Job
Market Signaling
Occupational licensing is one of the most important labor market institutions
in US. By 2008, around 29% of the workers required a license to work. (Kleiner and
Krueger, 2013). According to the rent-seeking theory, licensing is an “oppressive”
regulation that creates barriers of entry and promotes economic rents to the license
holders (Smith 1937; Friedman 1962). On the contrary, public interest theorists
claim that licensure can improve consumer welfare by screening out poor quality
practitioners (Leland 1979; Ronnen 1991). Though the two main theories posit
competing rationales for occpational licensing, they both predict the existence of a
wage premium for licensed workers, when compared with unlicensed workers.
We use occupational licensing as a context for testing statistical discrimination
in the labor market. The license premium typically estimated in the literature is an
average across both race and gender. This need not be the case that the licensing
premium for minorities and women are the same as for white men. If for example
the source of racial and gender wage gaps among unlicensed workers is asymmetric
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information, then black as well as female workers may receive higher license premiums
than white men, which could narrow the wage gaps with white men. To estimate
race-by-gender values of the licensing premium, we employ a triple-difference model
in which regressing log wages on a dummy for license status, and interaction of license
status with race and gender in addition to the standard controls for the wage regression
in the literature (Gittleman et al., 2015). We find that unlicensed black men, white
women and black women earn on average 13.3%, 19.9% and 22.1% less than unlicensed
white men. Among licensed workers, the wage gap between licensed white men and
licensed black men completely disappears; whereas the gender wage gap persists, with
licensed white women earning 11.5% and licensed black wome earning 18.3% less than
licensed white men.
The above results are robust after controlling endogeneity of individual’s licens-
ing status. Most of the empirical studies on license premium rely on OLS estimation
of a regression of log wages on licensure (Kleiner 2000; Kleiner and Krueger 2010, 2013;
Timmons and Thornton 2010). The license premium estimated from OLS, however,
can be upward or downward biased as the license decisions of individuals are correlated
with their own unobservable ability. To address this endogeneity concern, we propose
an Hausman-type instrument namely the out-state fraction of licensed workers in
one’s occupation, to mitigate against selection into licensing due to unobserved ability.
Using a recent nationally representative survey that covers 400 occupations, we find
that relative to the IV results, the OLS license premium is biased downward by the
range between 30.8% to 46.3% depending on race and gender. In the later part, we
also employ two alternative instruments, the out-region fraction of licensed workers
in an occupation and the burden of licensing in a state, as robustness checks. The
wage gap results from both OLS and the three IV specifications are consistent with
the observation that licensing closes the racial wage gap among black and white men
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but has minimal effects on the gender wage gaps for women of both races.
In the last section, we endeavor to explain why licensure has disproportion-
ate benefits on black men. First, licenses preclude felons from obtaining a license.
We find that state felony restrictions in licensure applications could partly explain
cross-sectional variations in racial wage gaps among licensed workers. In effect, the
unobservable for unlicensed black men is the felony record (and personal attributes
that are correlated with criminal behavior). Given that black men are on average
six times more likely to have felonies it could be that firms use licenses as screening
device.1 This is consistent with previous studies finding employers may statistically
discriminate against black men because of prior beliefs about criminal-related at-
tributes. Holzer et al. (2006) find that employer-initiated criminal background checks
raises the likelihood of hiring African-American men. In a more recent study, Wozniak
(2015) finds that drug testing increases black employments and relative wages. Second,
the gender wage gaps may be explained by preference-based discrimination. We follow
Charles and Guryan (2008)’s strategy to construct gender prejudice index for each
state and find no effect of gender prejudice in explaining the gender wage gap among
licensed workers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2.1, we review the
arguments of discrimination models and the related empirical studies. In particular,
Becker (1957)’s prejudice model and the statistical discrimination model predict
differently about the effects of licensing on wage gaps. Section 3.2 addresses the
endogeneity issues and the empirical strategies in estimating the license premiums.
Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 include the comparison of license premiums estimated
by OLS and IVs, and the analysis of gender prejudice. Session ?? discusses more
about the interpretations and Session 2.5 summarizes our findings and discuss the
1Felony statistics is from Bureau of Justice Statistics 2010.
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limitations.
2.1 Literature Review
In Becker (1957)’s seminal discussion about discrimination, a worker’s wage
equals the value of her marginal products of labor minus the employer’s prejudice
(the discrimination coefficient). As the level of prejudice varies across employers, the
extent of wage differences between blacks and whites is determined by the supply of
black workers and the discrimination coefficient of the marginal discriminator (i.e.
the most prejudiced employer whom the minority interacts with at the equilibrium).
However, the persistence of discrimination is undermined by perfect competition since
prejudiced firms employ equally productive white workers at higher costs than the
minority workers. In the long run, those firms will be replaced by their less prejudiced
counterparts (Arrow 1972, 1973). As licensing restricts the supply of practitioners,
the regulated industries are more able to satisfy their taste of discrimination at lower
costs.
Empirical evidences on the relationship between market structure and wage
gaps are mixed. Johnson (1978) finds market structure plays little role in residual wage
inequality between black and white. More strikingly, regulated industries discriminate
less because they are under more governmental pressure, or subject to government’s
grants and contracts. However, Heywood (1987) uses a finer division of industry and
finds the opposite result. Peoples (1994) extends Heywood’s analysis and finds that
the extent of racial wage differences depends on union status. They find that for
nonunion members, racial wage gap is larger in industries that face less competitions.
For union members, the magnitude of racial wage gaps is similar regardless of the
degree of market concentrations.
32
While Becker’s prejudice model posits that racial wage gaps should be larger
in licensed professions, statistical discrimination models provide different predictions
(Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973). As information is costly, employers use a group character-
istic, such as race and gender, as a proxy to infer workers’ productivity. Discrimination
against minority and female workers occurs when employers believe that workers of
these types are less qualified on average or if employers perceive these worker types
to have noisier signals of productivity (Coate and Loury, 1993). Since licensed practi-
tioners have to fulfill minimum entry standards, occupational licensing may update
employers’ priors about the mean as well as reduce the variance of the underlying
productivity of minority and female workers who have have occupational licenses. In
a model of statistical discrimination, licensure could solve information asymmetries,
narrowing the wage gaps and increase the presence of the disadvantaged groups (Le-
land 1979; Lundberg and Startz 1983; Law and Kim 2005). Law and Marks (2009)
empirically test the impact of licensing on minority representation using individual-
level data from 1870 to 1960 and find that licensing law could increase the employment
opportunity for female and black workers in skilled occupations including engineers,
pharmacists, plumbers, registered and practical nurses.
The theoretical arguments on the effects of occupational licensing on racial
and gender discrimination are competing. Also, we are unaware of any empirical work
on the heterogeneous effects of licensing on different race and gender groups. For
occupation-specific study, Timmons and Thornton (2010) use the 2000 US Census
and find barbers working in states with stricter regulations, in particular where
apprenticeship or barber assistant license is required, earn 11 to 22 percent more than
barbers in states which have less restrictions. Kleiner and Krueger (2010) conducted
the first national analysis about the influences of occupational license using data from
the Gallup survey that covers 300 occupations. Among 1,614 respondents, licensed
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workers receive 15 % higher wages than the unlicensed workers. Kleiner and Krueger
(2013) later use telephone survey to collect data from 2,513 individuals. They find
that licensed workers have 18 % higher wages. The wage premium is larger if the
license is issued by state governments than that issued by local governments and
private institutes. Gittleman et al. (2015) use the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP) which covers more than 20,000 individuals. Apart
from earning more, licensed worker are more likely to be employed and receive pension
plan offers.
This study builds on the above literatures and endeavors to reconcile the
difference in theoretical predictions about the effects of licensing on racial and gender
wage gaps. If the source of racial and gender wage gap is statistical discrimination,
license premiums for minorities and females should be higher than that for white
men. Apart from the heterogeneous effects of license premiums, we also address
the endogeneity issue that in the presence of selection the OLS estimate of license
premiums is biased. Detailed empirical strategies are discussed in the next section.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Data
This study employs data from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP) which is an individual-level dataset containing both
licensing information and personal details. The Core data, conducted from May
through November 2012, contains all necessary personal information. The topical
module which is conducted from September through December 2012 provides indi-
vidual’s licensure information. The sample is restricted to individuals with implied
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Table 2.1: Average hourly wage by groups
Not Licensed Licensed
Mean Std. Dev. N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. N Min. Max.
White
Male 24.57 15.77 23,769 5 100 27.72 16.08 5,982 5 99
Female 18.70 12.35 21,433 5 100 24.85 14.24 8,044 5 100
Black
Male 18.46 12.57 3,312 5 97 24.55 15.02 537 5 88
Female 16.25 10.80 4,028 5 89 20.53 13.06 1,155 5 83
Note: The data covers May through November in 2012. We restrict the sample to individuals aged between 18
to 64 with implied hourly wage from $5 to $100 on the main job. Races other Blacks and Whites are excluded.
Individuals holding credentials issued by private bodies are dropped.
hourly wage between $5 and $100, and age between 18 and 64.2
To enable comparison with previous literature, the criterion above are similar
to Gittleman et al. (2015). For the purpose of this study, our sample selection differs
in two ways: first, to differentiate “license” and “certification”, we exclude individuals
with credentials issued by private body. Second, ethnicities other than ‘White’ and
‘Black’ such as Asian and Hispanic are excluded. Table 2.1 provides summary statistics
about the implied hourly wages of different races and genders. By simply comparing
means without adjusting personal characteristics, the percentage increase in wages for
licensed white males is a lot lower than the other three groups which is suggestive to
our hypothesis that disadvantaged groups receive higher license premium. For white
male, the unadjusted license premium is around 13% while that for black male, white
female and black female are 33.4%, 31.7% and 28.5% respectively.
Another important aspect is that occupations are classified according to the
2010 Standard Occupational Classification. In this method, there are 23 major groups
such as “Management Occupations” and “Community and Social Service Occupa-
2The sample selections and the definitions of license follow Gittleman, Klee and Kleiner (2015).
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tions”. Each major group then has detailed subgroups that contain occupations with
similar characteristics. For example, “Social Worker” and “Counselors” belong to
the subgroup “Counselors, Social Workers, and Other Community and Social Service
Specialists” which is inside “Community and Social Service Occupations” Our 3-digit
occupation fixed effects are based on the detailed subgroups that enable us to iso-
late the wage variations due to different job natures.3 This is particularly important
in two ways. First, the license premium is interpreted as the comparison between
licensed and unlicensed professions within a detailed subgroup. This avoids noises
due to occupational differences. Second, when we address the selection bias using
instrumental variables, the selection problem can be narrowed to a detailed subgroup
that have similar requirements on skill endowments.
2.2.2 OLS Estimations
We first provide the baseline model that previous studies employ in estimating
the license premium unconditional on gender and race,
logWageim = α0 + α1licensei + α2blacki + α3femalei + γZ + im (2.1)
The dependent variable is the log of the implied hourly wage. The variable licensei
takes value of 1 if the individual has a license. The coefficient of interest is α1
which indicates the license premium. Other independent variables include a racial
indicator (black), female indicator (female), and Z which is a vector of control
variables including quadratic in age, education levels, union status, a government
worker indicator, a self-employed indicator, and a large-company indicator 4. It also
3For example, the occupation code for ‘Counselors’ is 21-1010 and ‘Social Workers’ is 21-1020.
The first three digits indicate the corresponding subgroup.
4Large company is defined as a company with more than 100 workers.
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includes state, month and 3-digit occupation fixed effects.
The above specification assumes that the magnitude of the license premium is
homogeneous across groups. However, as we argue, blacks or females can receive higher
license premium if the source of wage gaps among unlicensed workers is statistical
discrimination. To test this hypothesis, we employ the following triple-difference
model:
logWageim = β0 + β1licensei + β2blacki + β3femalei + β4black
∗
i femalei
+ β5licensei
∗blacki + β6 licensei
∗femalei
+ β7licensei
∗black∗i femalei + γZi + im (2.2)
The difference between Model 2.1 and 2.2 is that the independent variables include
also the interaction of gender, race and the license status. β1 now represents the
license premium for a white man. The license premium of a particular race or gender
other than white males is obtained by combining the corresponding coefficients of the
interaction terms. For example, β1 + β5 is the license premium for black male.
2.2.3 Instrument Variable
The above two OLS estimations suffer from a common problem: the estimated
effect of license premium is biased as the license decision is correlated with unobserved
ability. The OLS estimate is biased upward if individuals with better ability are self-
selected into licensed professions. On the contrary, the estimate is biased downward
if there is negative selection.
To address the endogeneity issue, we employ instrumental variable approach.
Our instrumental variable, called main IV thereafter, is the out-state fraction of
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licensed workers in one’s occupation. This is similar to the strategy used in solving
endogeneity of product prices (Hausman 1996; Nevo 2001). Prices of a particular brand
share a common cost component but are also affected by a stochastic component which
is independent across cities. Therefore, prices of brand i in other cities can be the
valid instruments for the price of brand i in city n.5 In our context, likelihood of
being licensed is affected by common characteristics of the occupation. For example,
within the same occupation sub-category, “Urban and regional planners” are more
likely to have a license than “Economists”. But, the likelihood is also affected by the
policy of local governments which we assume to be independent across states. The
independence assumption is based on the fact that there exist large state variations in
license requirement even for the same job . For example, a manicurist has to undergo
more than four months of training in 10 states but need only three-day and nine-day
training in Alaska and Iowa.6 The license policy as well as the wage level are largely
determined at local level which make the fraction of licensed workers in other states
a valid instrument.7
In the first stage estimation, the likelihood of having a license is obtained by
the following specification:
licensei,o,s = θ0 + θ1FracLicenseo,−s + θ2blacki + θ3femalei + γZi + i (2.3)
licensei,o,s is the likelihood of being licensed for individual i who lives in state
s and works in occupation o. FracLicenseo,−s is the fraction of licensed workers
in occupation o but excluding state s. θ1 is expected to be positive as the reasons
discussed above. The predicted likelihood is then used in the second stage as an
5For the sake of brevity, we do not discuss the time varying component in their original analysis.
6Statistics from Institute for Justice, US.
7The main IV and IV2 are computed using SIPP. Occupations with less than 10 observations are
dropped. The number of occupations covered goes down from 473 in OLS to 275 in 2SLS.
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instrument for the endogenous variable to estimate the license premiums in Model 2.1
and 2.2.
We also present the results using two additional instrumental variables: the out-
region fraction of licensed workers in an occupation (IV2) and the burden of licensing
in a state excluding own occupation (IV3). The motivation for IV2 is to tighten the
exclusion restriction of our baseline instrument. By excluding own region, we migrate
the concern that license policies and wage determinations may be correlated within a
Census region. For IV3, we define “burden” of licensure in a state as the variety of
licenses a state has. This provides another angle to check our results as we construct
this instrument by employing an external data source from CareerOneStop (2015).
This contains very detailed information of license name and the corresponding license
agency in each occupation and each state. The reason of using this instrument is that
an individual is less likely to have a license if the state where one lives has stringent
license restrictions. For example, in California, there are thirteen different types of
licenses in California for Construction Manager but only one type in Colorado for the
same occupation. As a result, we would expect individuals working in California to
face stricter licensing restrictions. Own occupation is excluded as the license structure
is correlated with wages in the same occupation. Table D7 summarizes states with
the heaviest burden of licensing and the most regulated occupations in that state.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Unconditional License Premium
We first present the results of license premium unconditional on gender and
race. Column (1) to (4) in Table D2 show the license premium with different control
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variables using OLS estimation. In Column (1), license premium is around 23.7%.
After controlling for personal characteristics, state and occupation fixed effects as
shown in Column (2)-(4), the coefficient goes down to 7.44% and remains significant.
This is in line with literature’s findings that there exists wage premium for licensed
workers. In particular, Gittleman et al. (2015) analyze the same dataset and find the
license premium is 6.2%. The small discrepancy is attributed to different samples we
focus on.8
Column (5) presents the unconditional license premium using the main IV. The
main IV has strong predictive powers on the likelihood of having a license and the first-
stage coefficient in Table D1 indicates that an individual in a particular occupation
is 69.9% more likely to have a license if the out-state fraction of licensed workers
in that occupation is 1% higher. The license premium after controlling selection
bias increases to 42.2%. This suggests that the OLS estimate is downward biased
that there is negative selection into licensing. Previous studies that analyze license
premium using instrumental variables also find that the OLS estimate has downward
bias (Kugler and Sauer 2005; Timmons and Thornton 2008). This supports the “rent-
seeking” theory that stricter licensing means higher opportunity costs for workers who
have better job alternatives.
2.3.2 Conditional License Premium
We now examine the heterogeneity of license premium across gender and race.
Table D4 compares the results of the triple-difference model from OLS and the three
instruments. After controlling for personal characteristics, state and occupation fixed
effects, the OLS estimate of license premium for a white man is 3.07% and it is
8Comparing to Gittleman et al. (2015), our sample is different in two main ways. First, individuals
with a credential issued by private body are excluded. Second, races other than blacks and whites
are excluded.
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significant. The smaller magnitude compared to the unconditional premium suggests
that the premium from other groups should be higher. We combine the corresponding
coefficients and show the license premiums of difference races and genders in Panel A
of Table D5. According to the OLS estimate in the first column, licensed black man
receives the highest license premium which is 12.0%. White and black woman also
have higher license premium than a white man that the effects are 7.9% and 7.6%
respectively. When we control for selection using the main IV, the license premium for
a white man is 36.9%. The license premiums for all other groups increase in similar
magnitudes. According to the estimation using main IV, the license premium for a
black man, white woman and black women are 58.3%, 46.9% and 38.4% respectively.
This indicates that the downward bias of OLS applies to all races and genders with
the range between 30.8% and 46.3%.
Extending from the analysis of heterogeneous license premiums, we investigate
whether the racial and gender wage gap narrow for licensed workers. Panel B of
Table D5 shows the wage gaps according to the license status and different estimation
methods. In each column, we compare the earnings of the gender or race group in
the corresponding row with the earnings of white males. First of all, OLS and the
main IV show that unlicensed black man earn 13.3% to 15.4% less than an unlicensed
white man. However, when we look at the comparison between licensed white man
and licensed black man in the second and fourth column, the racial wage gap closes.
Though the result of main IV shows that licesned black men earn slightly more, the
difference is not statistically different from zero. We then look at white female in the
third row. The gender wage gap between unlicensed white woman and unlicensed
white man is around 19%. Licensing helps narrow the wage gap but it remains remains
significant among licensed workers at around 11.5% to 10.1%. These patterns are not
the same for black women. In the last row, the wage gap for unlicensed black women
41
and white males is 21.6% to 22.8%. The magnitude remains similar and significant for
licensed workers. In short, licensing completely closes the racial wage gap among black
males and white males, and narrows the gender wage gap between slightly. Licensing,
however, has the smallest effect on the wage gap between black females and white
males.
2.4 Further Analysis
The previous results indicate that licensing helps improve the racial wage
gap among white and black men but has minimal effects on gender wage gaps. In
this section, we first show that the results are indeed consistent by presenting two
alternative instruments. Then, we test the felony hypothesis In the second part of
this section, we test whether the wage gap results can be explained by the felony
hypothesis and gender prejudice.
2.4.1 Robustness Checks
We estimate again the unconditional and conditional license premium using
the out-region fraction of licensed workforce in an occupation (IV2), and the burden of
licensing in a state excluding own occupation (IV3). The first stage results of the three
instruments are shown in Table D1. Both IV2 and IV3 provide a strong first stage.
The correlation between IV3 and the likelihood of obtaining a license is negative which
coincides with our predictions. In second stage, the unconditional license premiums of
the three instruments are similar as shown in Figure 2.1. From Table D3, the estimates
from the three instruments range from 41.3% to 67.2% and they all lie in overlapping
confidence intervals. All the instruments show that the OLS are significantly biased
downward. One important observation is that the coefficients of gender and race as
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Figure 2.1: Unconditional License Premium of different methods. The error bar
indicates 90% confidence interval.
well as the constant term are similar for all the estimation methods. This suggests
that the instruments do pick up the effects of the unobservables.
By combining the relevant coefficients in Table D4, we then examine whether
the wage gap analysis in the previous section is sensitive to the type of instrument
we employ. Figure 2.2 visualizes the wage gaps between white males and the disad-
vantaged groups among licensed workers using different estimation methods. First,
racial wage gap among black and white men are insignificant in OLS and all of the
IV specifications. Though licensed black males earn slightly higher than licensed
white males using main IV and IV2, the difference is statistically insignificant. This
confirms the first conclusion: licensing closes the racial wage gap among black and
white males. Second, the magnitude of gender wage gap for licensed white females
and black females are similar. For white women, the wage gap is narrowed by 7.89%
to 9.84%. The change of the wage gap for black females is 4.5% which is significant
under OLS estimation. However, the changes become insignificantly different from
zero using the IVs which ranges from to 0.52% to 1.36% . This confirms the second
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Figure 2.2: Comparison of racial and gender wage gap using different instruments.
The error bar indicates 90% confidence interval.
conclusion: licensing has minimal effects on gender wage gap of both races.
In the absence of selection bias, the comparison of licensed and unlicensed
profession using OLS can be decomposed into two parts. The first part is explained
by human capital factors. In this part, the wage difference between licensed and
unlicensed profession is due to differences in skill endowments and different returns to
the same set of skills. The second part which cannot be explained by observables is
attributed to the effects of licensing. Kleiner (2000) uses this decomposition method
and find that due to licensing, licensed dentists earn 45% more than unlicensed biolog-
ical and life scientists. The detailed occupation fixed effects we impose effectively rule
out the differences due to human capital factors as skill endowments and skill rewards
within a detailed subgroup are very similar. In the absence of endogeneity issue, the
estimated effects of 7.55% can be interpreted as the wage difference between licensed
and unlicensed profession within a detailed occupation group, and this difference is
due to the regulation.
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However, the estimated license premium using OLS is biased if unobservable
ability is correlated with licensing decision. There are two opposing arguments. “Pub-
lic interest” theorists argue that licensing helps screen out poor practitioners. Positive
selection should occur and licensed workers are those with higher ability. In this
case the estimated effects are biased upwards as part of the returns to the regulated
profession is due to higher quality of workers. In contrast, “Rent-seeking” theorists
treat licensing as a barrier to entry. The aim to impose strict license requirements
is to limit the supply of practitioners so that the license holders receive monopoly
profits. Fulfilling license requirements is too costly for higher ability individuals as
they have better alternatives in finding other jobs. In this sense, negative selection
occurs and the OLS estimate of license premium is biased downward.
The evidence in this paper supports the rent-seeking theory but the selection
problem needs more elaborations. In general, selection into licensing can happen
at different margins. Given an individual is working in the profession, we call the
decision to acquire a license the “intensive margin”. Timmons and Thornton (2008)
use the size of state’s licensing board as an instrument and find that the OLS estimate
of the premium for Radiologic Technologists working in states that require licensing
is biased downward by 3.6%. On the contrary, we call the selection into a licensed
profession the “extensive margin”. The counterfactual will be an individual who does
not have a license in profession A and works in profession B. Kugler and Sauer (2005)
exploit the random retraining assignment rule for immigrant physicians in Israel and
find the OLS estimate is biased downward for 90%. The impact they identify is the
increase in earnings if the immigrant works as a licensed physician versus working in
other professions that does not require a license. Our results are similar to the latter
case that we identify the “extensive margin” within a narrowly defined occupation
subgroups. While the dataset we employ covers a nationally representative set of
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professions, our results lie between these IV estimates in the literature.
2.4.2 Felony Hypothesis
The above sections show that licensure disproportionally benefits black males.
As we argue, employers may use occupational licensing as a screening device for
criminal-related attributes. According to the statistics from American Bar Associa-
tion summarized by Mulady (2016), there are on average 59 mandatory restrictions
in licensing applications for people with a felony conviction. Commonly restricted
professions include law enforcement and security, health care and legal services. Out
of around 400 possible occupations according to Census coding method, TableD8
shows that the most restrictive state, Texas, has 133 felony restrictions in licensure
applications.
To empirically test the felony hypothesis, we exploit these cross-section varia-
tions in licensing restrictions for felons. In the first stage, we obtain the racial wage
gap in each state by the following model:
lnWageim = δ0 + γX +
K∑
k=1
δk(Sk ∗ blacki) + im (2.4)
We apply Specification 2.4 separately to unlicensed and licensed workers and obtain
cross-sectional variations in racial wage gaps. Sk is an indicator for State K. The
vector X includes controls of standard personal characteristics, a female indicator,
as well as state, month and occupation fixed effects. Therefore, δˆk is the estimated
racial wage gap in state K adjusted for the wage variations due to human capital,
occupational factors, and state variations in economic performances. In second stage,
we regress δˆk on the number of licensing restrictions for felons.
9 If the observation
9The regression is weighted by the precision that takes into account each state has different sizes
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that licenses close the racial wage gap can be explained by the felony hypothesis, the
second stage coefficient should be positive and significant.
Column (1) of Table D9 shows that there is no significant effects of licensing
restriction for felons of racial wage gaps among unlicensed workers which is expected.
However, when we look at Column (2), the effects become marginally significant for
licensed workers. For one standard deviation increase in felony restrictions (which is
30), the racial wage gap is lowered by approximately 0.037 log points which is around
42% of the mean racial wage gap among licensed workers. States with three standard
deviations in felony restrictions such as Florida and Ohio could find no expected wage
gap between licensed black men and licensed white men. Given the data limitations
of SIPP that there is no black observations in some states, we can only include 42
states for unlicensed workers and 39 states for licensed workers. However, the result
here provides suggestive evidences to the felony hypothesis.
2.4.3 Gender Prejudice
In this part, we test the hypothesis that the gender wage gap among licensed
or unlicensed workers can be partly explained by gender prejudice. The construction
of gender prejudice index follows closely the strategy adopted by Charles and Guryan
(2008) in analyzing the relationship between racial prejudice and racial wage gap.
More specifically, we look at four specific questions that related to gender
animus and have consistently been asking in the General Social Survey (GSS) from
1974-1998. The questions ask about the attitudes towards female participation in
politics and the role of women in the family. We assign scores to each question such
that the higher the score the more gender biased the response is. For example, the
score equals “2”, “0” or “-2” if the individual agrees, not sure, or do not agree that
of observations.
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“men are better suited emotionally for politics than are women”. For brevity, we show
the scaling method in Table D10. To test the influence of gender prejudice, we focus
on the response by white and black men. An aggregate index of individual i at time
t, Dit, is then obtained by averaging the scores from the four questions.
Figure 2.3 and 2.4 show the downward trend of sexism using the average
normalized score of each question and the average prejudice level across regions. To
ensure the variations of prejudice index are only due to cross-sectional differences,
we obtain the adjusted prejudice index for each individual which is the residual by
regressing Dit on year fixed effects.
Figure 2.3: Trends in responses to the four gender prejudice questions from 1974 to
1998.
We focus on two measures of prejudice: marginal sexist and average prejudice
level in a state. As only the regional level data is available to public, we have to assume
the distributions of gender prejudice are the same within a Census region. Average
prejudice is obtained by the mean prejudice level of each region. The marginal sexist
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Figure 2.4: Trends in average gender prejudice across regions from 1974 to 1998.
is defined by the pth percentile of the prejudice distribution in a region, where p is
the fraction of labor force that is woman in a state in 2012.10
The empirical strategy is the same as testing the felony hypothesis. In the first
stage, we obtain the gender wage gap in each state by the following model:
lnWageim = δ0 + γX +
50∑
k=1
δk(Sk ∗ femalei) + im (2.5)
Again, we apply Specification 2.5 separately to unlicensed and licensed workers and
obtain cross-sectional variations in gender pay gaps. The only difference in the vector
X is replacing the female indicator with a racial indicator. Sk is an indicator for State
K.11. This time, δˆk is the estimated gender wage gap in state K. In second stage, we
regress δˆk on the marginal sexist and average prejudice level.
12 If the state variations
10The labor force statistics is from CPS 2012. The range across states is around 43% to 51%.
11There is no observations in District of Columbia in SIPP.
12The regression is weighted by the precision that takes into account each state has different sizes
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in the adjusted gender pay gap can be explained by cross-sectional differences in
gender prejudice, the coefficient of the prejudice index in second stage should be
negative and significant.
Table D11 reports the results from the second stage. Column (1) and (2)
shows that the coefficients are negative, That is, for unlicensed workers, the more
prejudiced the marginal male or the higher the average gender prejudice level, the
larger the gender pay gap. However, the effects are insignificant when one of them is
held constant in Column (3). For gender wage gap among licensed workers, Column
(4) and (6) show that marginal sexist as well as average prejudice level has insignificant
effects. Charles and Guryan (2008) adopt the same specification and the effect of
marginal racist remains significant even though the average racial prejudice level
is held constant. Therefore, we conclude that the evidences of gender prejudice in
explaining the gender pay gap are weak.
2.5 Conclusion
The important result we present here is that licensing completely close the racial
wage gap among white men and black men. It narrows the gender pay gap for white
females and has the least effects on black females. These observations are consistent
with both OLS and after controlling for endogeneity using three different instruments.
We have two explanations. In Section 2.4.2, we provide suggestive evidences that
occupational licensing is a screening device for criminal-related attributes as felons
are precluded from obtaining licenses in many cases. Even information on criminal
records may be available on some occasions, part of the racial wage gap among
unlicensed workers may be due to the penalty of having felony convictions. We then
of observations.
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look at whether there are sources other than information asymmetries that contribute
to the gender wage differentials. In Section 2.4.3, we try to examine whether the
remaining gender gap can be explained by gender prejudice and the evidence is weak.
There are several ways to extend the existing analysis. First, Kugler and Sauer
(2005) find that the license premium of Radiologic Technologists in Israel is the largest
among the lower quantile using conventional quantile analysis. It is interesting to
investigate the patterns of the license premium as well as the bias of OLS across
various income quantile. Second, one of the reasons that the gender prejudice results
are insignificant could be that we are employing public data from GSS which only
provides regional variations of prejudice index. It is a fruitful extension if the analysis
can be applied to finer geographic divisions.
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Chapter 3
How Much Of Barrier To Entry Is
Occupational Licensing?
An occupational license is a state issued credential that a worker must possess
to legally work for pay (Friedman, 1962). In the past six decades, the instance of
occupational licensing in the United States has increased from a coverage of around
5% of the U.S. labor force, to a present-day coverage of close to 25% of the U.S. labor
force. Similarly, in the European Union, 22% of workers report having an occupational
license (Koumenta and Pagliero, 2018).
The primary focus of the literature on occupational licensing is estimating
the licensing premium (Kleiner and Krueger, 2013; Koumenta et al., 2014; Gittleman
et al., 2015; Thornton and Timmons, 2013).1 The literature on the employment
effects of occupational licensing is by comparison more nascent but no less important.
Kleiner and Soltas (2018) show that the employment effect of licensing is a sufficient
1Most estimates place the wage premium from a 6%-15%, with the lower end of the spectrum
representing the most contemporary estimates, for which the data quality and coverage is improved.
In a prior work, we also show that there is substantial heterogeneity in the licensing premium by
race and gender, which occupational licenses functioning as a labor market signal for women and
minorities (Blair and Chung, 2018).
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statistic for the welfare consequences of licensing. This finding makes studying the
employment effects of licensing an important matter for public policy. Law and Marks
(2009) use data from the introduction of licensing in a select group of industries
during the period 1870-1960 to show that there are no negative labor supply effects of
licensing for women and minorities. By contrast, Hall et al. (2018) show that female
participation on the Uber platform increases after deregulation, which suggests that
licensing has a negative effect on female labor supply in the ride sharing industry.
Likewise, Kleiner and Park (2010) show that reducing the prescribing ability of nurses
reduces hours worked by 3%.
We make several contributions to the literature on the employment effects of
occupational licensing. First, we update the evidence on the equilibrium labor supply
effects of licensing, building on the work of Law and Marks (2009). In this respect
our paper is more similar to Kleiner and Soltas (2018), who use 2016 data to estimate
the labor supply effect of licensing. Second, we use quasi-experimental variation to
estimate the employment effects of licensing, following similar approaches used to
estimate the wage impacts of occupational licensing (Pizzola and Tabarrok, 2017; Hall
et al., 2018). Third, we explore heterogeneity in the response to licensing by gender
and race. Fourth, we explore heterogeneity in the equilibrium labor supply by the
attributes of the license. Many licenses require workers to pass an exam, undergo
training, pursue continuing education. Some licensed occupations also preclude ex-
offenders from obtaining a license (Blair and Chung, 2018). Federman et al. (2006)
shows that additional licensing requirements, in the case of manicurist, reduces labor
supply, whereas Pagliero (2010) shows that requirements like exams are correlated
with increased wages for workers.
In our paper we use a new data set that we created in prior work on the
licensing regulations affecting ex-offenders and merge this with data from the 2015-
53
2017 Current Population Survey (CPS) and the 2008 Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) to estimate a model of occupational choice (Train et al., 1987).
In our model, occupational selection is driven by wages, whether the occupation
is licensed, a measure of the occupation’s desirability (that is constant across all
workers), and idiosyncratic workers’ tastes for the occupation. We embed a boundary
discontinuity design in our empirical model to compare employment in occupations
across state boundary pairs where the occupation is licensed on one side of the
boundary but unlicensed on the other side of the boundary. This design is motivated by
the work of Black (1999a) who developed this research design to estimate households’
willingness to pay for quality schooling. We follow Bayer et al. (2007b) by embedding
this boundary discontinuity design in a discrete choice framework.
Our results suggest that the presence of occupational licensing reduces labor
supply by an average of 17%-27%. From our boundary discontinuity estimates, we
find that the magnitude of the labor supply effect of licensing increases by 2/3
relative to OLS estimates. Moreover, we find that the negative labor supply effects
of occupational licensing are particularly large for white workers and comparatively
smaller for black workers. Our estimates are similar to the employment effects reported
in Kleiner (2006), where it is shown that partially licensed occupations grow at a
rate of 20% less than unlicensed occupations. Our estimates are also in line with
the estimates in Johnson and Kleiner (2015), who find that state-specific licensing
laws reduce inter-state mobility of workers by 36%, whereas national licensing has no
negative effect on inter-state mobility of workers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the discrete
choice model and embedded boundary discontinuity design which we used to estimate
the effect of licensing on labor supply. Second, we describe the data used to estimate
the model. Following this we present and discuss our results.
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3.1 Empirical Specification
3.1.1 Base Model
Our empirical model follows the random utility model which is a standard
empirical method in discrete choice settings (McFadden, 1973; Train et al., 1987;
Berry et al., 1995; Bayer et al., 2007b). In the base case we model the indirect utility
of person i in state s working in occupation o to be a function of wages ωos, an
indicator for whether the state has a licensing requirement in that occupation Los,
and an occupational fixed effect ξo which captures the desirability of the occupation,
and a state-fixed effect λs. Workers choose an occupation to maximize their expected
utility, which is given by:
Uiso = θlog(ωos) + βLos + ξo + λs + ios. (3.1)
We further assume that each worker has unobserved tastes, ios, that are independently
and identically distributed and follow a type 1 extreme value distribution. On the
strength of this assumption on the distribution of unobserved tastes, we obtain a
closed-form solution for the market shares for each occupation (mos) as a function of
the observed characteristics of the occupation and the parameters of the model. In
the market share equation below, qos is the number of workers in state s who choose
occupation o and qs is the total number of workers the state:
mos =
qos
qs
=
exp(θlog(ωos) + βLos + ξo)∑
o′ exp(θlog(ωo′s) + βLo′s + ξo′)
. (3.2)
The key parameter of interest is β, which is a measure of the effect of a licensing
requirement on the equilibrium market share of an occupation. At this point we are
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not making any distinctions based on race and gender in constructing the market
shares. We will construct race-by-gender market shares later to explore whether there
are differential effects of licensing on equilibrium labor supply. To estimate β, we
compute the market share mo∗s for a reference occupation o
∗ and take the ratio of the
market share of occupation o to the market share of the reference occupation o∗. This
strategy has the flavor of a first difference procedure, since taking the ratio gets rid of
the common denominator in the expression for the market shares of both occupations
o and o∗. We then take the log of this ratio to arrive at our estimating equation:
log
(
mos
mo∗s
)
= θlog
(
ωos
ωo∗s
)
+ β(Los − Lo∗s) + ξo − ξo∗ . (3.3)
Moreover, by taking the log of the ratio of market shares we arrive at an inter-
pretation of the parameter of interest in terms of its effect on the observed equilibrium
labor supply – notably – imposing a licensing requirement on an occupation reduces
its relative equilibrium market share by 100 x β percent.2 Importantly, β is also the
marginal utility to workers of an occupation being licensed. It is a deep parameter of
the utility model in equation (3.1). In the results section of the paper we show that
our estimated value of β is not sensitive to the choice of the reference occupation,
which is consistent with it being a deep parameter of the model.
3.1.2 Accounting for Features of Licenses
Many occupational licenses have human capital requirements and/or impose
restrictions on the ability of ex-offenders to possess the license. These human capital
and ex-offender requirements create additional barriers to entry that may further
2In practice, we could estimate equation (3.2) using a maximum likelihood approach, given the
non-linear relationship between the parameter of interest and the observable market shares.
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influence workers’ selection into a licensed occupation. To account for this, we enrich
our utility model to allow these features of the license to alter the estimated marginal
utility of licensing. In our enriched occupational choice model, we define new variables:
Lfos = 1 if the occupation has a restriction on ex-offenders and 0 otherwise; and L
h
os = 1
if there is (are) additional human capital requirements and 0 otherwise:
log
(
mos
mo∗s
)
= θlog
(
ωos
ωo∗s
)
+β0(Los−Lo∗s)+β1(Lfos−Lfo∗s)+β2(Lhos−Lho∗s)+ξo−ξo∗
(3.4)
With this specification, we are particularly interested in whether β1 and β2 are different
from zero. If so, this would provide evidence that the additional features of the license
affect the occupational selection of workers.
There are four potential human capital requirements which we observe in the
data: an examination requirement, a continuing education requirement, a training
requirement, and whether it took more than 1 month to obtain the license. We code
the human capital requirements of occupational licenses by drawing on the following
four questions in the SIPP that were asked of respondents who reported having a
license or certificate on a prior question: (1) “Did the respondent have to demonstrate
skills while on the job or pass a test or exam to earn the certification or license?”;
(2) “Did the respondent take courses or training to earn the certification or license?”;
(3) “Did the respondent have to take periodic tests or continuing education classes or
earn CEUs to maintain the certification or license?”; and (4) “How long did it take
to earn this certificate?”
3.1.3 Heterogeneous Responses by Race and Gender
So far, our market shares include workers of all race and gender groups. To
test whether licensing affects women and minorities differently from white men, we
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compute separate market shares by race and gender and use them as our dependent
variable. We denote the market shares of each occupation by race-gender groups by:
mgos =
qgos
qgs
(3.5)
where qgos is the number of workers of group g in state s who choose occupation o;
and qgs is the number of workers of group g in state s. We focus our analysis on four
groups – white men and white women, and black men and black women. As before,
we also compute the market share of the reference occupation (mgo∗s) and compute all
other market shares relative to this market share of the reference occupation. This
yields the following estimating equation for each demographic group:
log
(
mgos
mgo∗s
)
= θlog
(
ωgos
ωgo∗s
)
+βg0(Los−Lo∗s)+βg1(Lfos−Lfo∗s)+βg2(Lhos−Lho∗s)+ξgo−ξgo∗ .
(3.6)
One challenge in running this specification is that we get many occupations with
market shares equal to 0. For black men and black women, who represent a smaller
share of the U.S. population, this problem is particularly acute. When we run our
regression, we omit occupations with zero market shares. We prefer this strategy to
the imputation of market shares because the imputation process will introduce two
types of biases. First, a market share of 0 could reflect the fact that workers of that
group have a high disutility of that occupation. Alternatively, a market share of 0
could reflect the fact that workers of that group are a small fraction of the population
of workers in the given state.
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3.1.4 Boundary Discontinuity Design
The approaches outlined so far exploit the cross-state variation in licensing
laws. To tighten the identification assumption, we adopt a boundary discontinuity
design as in Black (1999a), in which we restrict our sample to border counties in
the US and include boundary fixed effects. By restricting the sample to boundary
counties and including boundary fixed effects, we are controlling for local labor market
conditions that could influence the occupational choice decision independently of the
licensing regime. The underlying assumption is that counties located next to each other
have similar observed as well as unobserved characteristics except for the licensing
requirements, which differ state-to-state. This identification strategy using policy
discontinuity at the state borders has been adopted in several influential studies:
Bayer et al. (2007b), Huang (2008), and Dube et al. (2010).
To implement this research design, we create a set of shared boundary dummies
~BDj(c) – one for each shared boundary. Each of these J boundary dummies equals
1 for all of the counties that share this unique boundary and zero for every other
county. For example, if Texas and Oklahoma share boundary BDj(c)=1 then the
associated boundary dummy BDj(c)=1 = 0 for all counties not in Texas and Oklahoma;
moreover BDj(c)=1 = 0 for all counties in Texas and Oklahoma except those counties in
Texas and Oklahoma which share the Texas-Oklahoma boundary – for these counties
BDj(c)=1 = 1. Texas also borders New Mexico and Louisiana hence some counties in
Texas will have multiple state boarders. For counties with multiple state boarders,
there may be multiple border dummies equal to one and equally lots of variation in
licensing laws in a highly localized geography.
To implement this strategy empirically, we compute the market shares for each
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occupation at the county-level:
moc =
qoc
qc
. (3.7)
where qoc is the number of workers in county c who work in occupation o and qc is the
number of workers in county c. Similarly, the heterogeneous market shares by race
and gender group g are given by:
mgoc =
qgoc
qgc
(3.8)
where qgoc is the number of workers in county c belonging to group g who work in
occupation o and qgc is the number of workers in county c belonging to group g. Our
boundary fixed effects analog to equation (3.3) is:
log
(
mo,c
mo∗,c
)
= θlog
(
ωoc
ωo∗c
)
+ β(Los − Lo∗s) + ξo − ξo∗ +
j(c)=J∑
j(c)=1
γjBDj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Boundary Fixed Effects
, (3.9)
and our boundary fixed effect analog to equation (3.6) is:
log
(
mgo,c
mgo∗,c
)
= θlog
(
ωgoc
ωgo∗c
)
+βg0(Los−Lo∗s)+βg1(Lfos−Lfo∗s)+βg2(Lhos−Lho∗s)+
j(c)=J∑
j(c)=1
γjBDj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Boundary FX
+ξgo−ξgo∗ .
(3.10)
When we run these regressions, we restrict our sample to the boundary counties, i.e.
those counties for which
∑j(c)=J
j(c)=1 BDj ≥ 1.
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3.2 Data & Descriptive Statistics
3.2.1 Licensing Variables
We use a combination of data sets for the licensing variables: a new data
set on felony restrictions created by Blair and Chung (2018), the 2008 panel (Wave
13) of the SIPP, and the 2015 CPS. To define an occupation in our data, we adopt
the 2010 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). In this method, there are 23
2-digit major groups such as “Management Occupations” and “Community and Social
Service Occupations.” Each 2-digit major group then has detailed 3-digit subgroups
that contain 6-digit professions with similar characteristics. For example, the 6-
digit professions “Social Worker” and “Counselors” belong to the 3-digit subgroup
“Counselors, Social Workers, and Other Community and Social Service Specialists”
which is a subgroup of the 2-digit “Community and Social Service Occupations.”3
Our occupation is defined by the 6-digit professions. The basic licensing variable, L
in Section 3.1, is defined by a 50-50 rule: we report a 6-digit occupation as a licensed
profession if 50% or more of the workers in that state-occupation pair report having
a license in the CPS.
As noted in Section 3.1.2, we are interested in whether various features of
licensing laws create additional distortions to the labor market. Therefore, we make
use of two external sources of licensing. First, as noted in Gittleman et al. (2015), the
licensing module in the SIPP contains detailed information on the types of licenses,
namely whether the worker is required to take an examination, continuing education,
training, and the duration of acquisition. Again, we employ the 50-50 rule to decide
if an occupation in a state has a particular type of license requirement.4 Second, the
3For example, the occupation code for ‘Counselors’ is 21-1010 and ‘Social Workers’ is 21-1020.
The first three digits indicate the corresponding subgroup.
4Certification is not counted as a license in our analysis.
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ex-offender data created by Blair and Chung (2018) includes license restrictions that
felons face in licensed occupations at the occupation-by-state level. This data was
generated using a database hosted by the American Bar Association (ABA) Criminal
Justice Section that specifies the 16,343 legal restrictions faced by ex-offenders seeking
occupational licenses. Because we matched the occupations in the ABA database
to their corresponding 2010 SOC occupations, we can directly merge the licensing
requirements governing ex-offenders and the licensing requirements in CPS 2015 and
the SIPP.
3.2.2 Data on Labor Supply and Wage
Our main source of data is the 2015 Basic Monthly Survey of the Current
Population Survey (CPS 2015). We choose the 2015 CPS because we have additional
data from an external source, CareerOneStop (2015), with licensing coverage for that
year. We use this external data source to show that the measurement error introduced
by our procedure of assigning licensing based on a 50-50 rule does not bias our results.
We will further show the robustness of our results by analyzing different years of
sample, namely 2016 and 2017. To select our sample, we follow Gittleman et al.
(2015): an individual has to be in the labor force, age between 18 and 64 with hourly
wage between $5 and $100.
3.2.3 The State Border Sample
The border counties in the 2015 CPS are in 17 places: Arizona, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Indiana, Illinois, Idaho, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, New
York, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas, New Mexico, Virginia and
Washington. The limited coverage of border states suggests that there is a trade-off
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between the strength of the empirical design with the border discontinuity approach
and the external validity of the results to the entire US. To give a better sense of how
comparable the border counties are to the full sample, we report summary statistics
for both in Table E1. The licensing coverage in border counties mirrors the coverage
in the full sample and this matching is consistent for all the types of licenses that
we observe in our data. For example, 22% of the state-occupation observations in
our data reflect occupations that are licensed and 21% of the county-occupation pairs
in our data reflect licensed occupations. The border counties are also similar on
some demographics to the full sample – e.g. the fraction of women is 49% in the full
sample and 50% in the border sample; the fraction of government employees 17% and
16% and the mean age 41.1 years and 40.8 years (respectively). The border sample,
however, has on average more minorities (blacks: 15% versus 11%, Hispanics 20%
versus 14%) and more college educated workers (40% versus 36%) than the full sample.
This difference in the racial and educational composition of the border sample from
the full sample informs the external validity of our results. The extent to which the
boarder sample is or is not representative of the full sample determines the extent to
which we believe that these estimates apply to the population at large.
3.2.4 The Reference Occupation
As noted in Section 3.2, an important component of our estimation is the
choice of the reference group o∗. The most important criteria is that the occupation
has wide coverage to avoid dropping out observations because of zero appearing in the
denominator of the ratio of market shares: mos
mo∗s
. As shown in Table E2, ‘Elementary
and middle school teachers’ is the most common occupation in our sample (measured
by the number of counties that have at least one worker in that occupation). For
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this reason, we chose it to be our reference occupation. One might worry about the
sensitivity of our results to the choice of the reference group because this profession
is a universally licensed occupation, as reported in Table E3. To check the robustness
of our results, in Section 3.4 we will instead use ‘Manager, all other’, as the reference
occupation. The manager occupation ranks 3rd on the list of most common occupa-
tions, which satisfies the condition of minimizing the number of missing observations
in our empirical design. Moreover, the manager occupation is a universally unlicensed
occupation, unlike teaching which is universally licensed. In Table E4 we report an
augmented set of summary statistics that also include the market share relative to
the market share of the reference occupation and the wages relative to the wages in
the reference occupation. The average wage relative to the reference occupation is at
or above 90% in both samples and the market share in the reference occupation is 3
to 8 times larger than the average market share.
3.3 Results
In Table E5, we present the results of running equation (3.3) at the state level.
In column 1, we regress the relative market share on the relative wage and licensing
variable, and column 2 we further add 6-digit occupation fixed effects. In the model
without occupation fixed effects, the constant term in the regression output represents
the average difference between the occupation fixed effects of all occupations and the
occupation fixed effect of the reference occupation, i.e. E[ξo − ξo∗ ] = E[ξo]− ξo∗ . In
our model with occupation fixed effects, the constant term in the regression output
represents the negative of the occupation fixed effect of the reference occupation, i.e.
−ξo∗ , since the inclusion of the occupation fixed effects absorbs the ξo terms. While
the inclusion of occupation fixed effects does increase the effect of relative wages (by
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almost double) and the explanatory power of the regression (from R2 = 0.005 to
R2 = 0.724), the estimated labor supply response to licensing remains approximately
the same as the model without occupation fixed effects.5 In both specifications, the
presence of occupational licensing decreases relative labor supply by 17%-19%.
In Table E6, we further study whether the labor supply response to licens-
ing differs based on the licensing requirements. We consider the following licensing
requirements: felony ban, exam, training, continuing education, and an acquisition
period greater than 1 month. In column (1), we run our base model with no additional
licensing requirements. In column (2)-(6) we add in each licensing requirement one at
a time. In column (7) we run a saturated model in which we control for the presence of
all 5 licensing requirements. From the naive regression that includes a single licensing
requirement, adding a licensing requirement reduces the negative effect of licensing
on labor supply by almost half. In our fully saturated model, however, we only find
a positive effect of the training requirement on labor supply – all the other licens-
ing requirements enter with a negative sign, i.e. they exacerbate the negative labor
supply effect of licensing. It is important to note that of these negative requirement
effects, only the acquisition duration is statistically different from zero. Increasing the
licensing duration, however, doubles the negative labor supply effect of occupational
licensing.
The results from the boundary discontinuity design are presented in Table E7.
We find that the negative labor supply effect of licensing increases in magnitude by
10 percentage points from -17% to -27%. This suggest that the OLS estimates were
5Most of the explanatory power of our regression is coming from the inclusion of the occupation
fixed effects. This suggest that, to first order, market shares of various occupations differ primarily
because the occupations are different in ways that go beyond differences in observed wages and
licensing regulation. This is consistent with demand for an occupation being a key driver of the
equilibrium number of workers in a given occupation. In light of this fact, the reader should not be
surprised when the estimated constant and R2 do not change substantially as we add more regressors.
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understating the negative labor supply effect of occupational licensing. In contrast
to the results in Table E6, we also find that each of the licensing requirements, when
entered separately, have a negative, but insignificant, effect on labor supply, above and
beyond the direct negative labor supply effect of licensing. In our saturated model,
none of these licensing attributes are statistically different from zero. It is worth
noting that the exam requirement has a large but statistically insignificant effect on
labor supply, which offsets the negative effect of the occupation being licensed.
We now turn to our results of whether occupational licensing and licensing
requirements have heterogeneous labor supply effects by race and gender. We start
our analysis first looking at the results that exploit state variation in licensing laws.
First, in Table E8, we look at the effect of licensing on labor supply, not accounting
for the additional requirements of the license. For men, we find that licensing has a
negative statistically significant effect on labor supply. Licensing reduces the relative
labor supply of white men by 15.2% and black men by 18.9%. By contrast the labor
supply effects for women are statistically insignificant and close to zero. This result is
important because it suggests that licensing only distorts the labor supply of men. We
know from Blair and Chung (2018), that women earn a larger licensing premium than
men even when the license has no additional requirement, whereas men only earn a
statistically significant licensing wage premium when the license has some additional
attributes. This suggests that occupational licensing may have wage effect without
an appreciably negative employment effect for women.6
We next estimate a model in which we allow for heterogeneous labor supply
6It is worth noting that the wage coefficients for black men and black women are biased towards
zero. Looking at the sample sizes by race, we suspect that our wage estimates are biased toward
zero because of the small sample size of occupations in which we observe non-zero market shares for
black workers of both genders. As suggestive evidence supporting this claim, we do not observe a
similar bias in the wage coefficients among white workers. In fact, the wage parameter estimates for
white men and white women are almost identical (0.144 and 0.135, respectively).
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effects of additional licensing requirements by race and gender. The results in Table E9
confirm what we saw is that there is a negative labor supply effect of occupational
licensing for men but not women. Of the additional licensing requirements, the only
significant effects are a negative effect of acquisition duration on white women and
a positive marginally significant effect of training for white women. The positive
training effect for white women explains a result in our earlier work, where we found a
positive wage effect of training requirements for white women (Blair and Chung, 2018).
The positive labor supply effect here and the positive wage effect that we documented
in our previous paper point to white women sorting into licensed occupations with
training requirements as a way of signalling ability. Note that the effect of a felony
ban, though statistically insignificant, is mostly negative for black men and almost
double the negative baseline effect of licensing on black male employment. This result
accords with the fact that black men are more likely to have a felony record than
other groups in the data. This negative labor supply effect of the felony ban for black
men offsets the positive wage effect that we documented in our prior work for black
men in occupations with felony bans. In stark contrast to these results for black
men, the presence of a felony restriction moves the estimate on licensing for white
men from -0.151 to -0.034, which is in line with the estimated effect of licensing on
equilibrium labor supply for white women. These results are consistent with a story
in which felony restrictions on licenses result in a net employment gain for white men
and a net employment loss for black men, within occupation. This is not to say that
the resorting due to this restriction is in equilibrium detrimental to black men or
advantageous to white men.
We now look at the results of the effects of occupational licensing on employ-
ment by race and gender using the boundary discontinuity design. Before delving into
the results, it is important to note that cutting the data in this way we lose a large
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fraction of the data. For white men and women in our occupation-by-state sample,
we have 10-12 thousand observations, whereas in the boundary discontinuity sample
we have slightly more than 3 thousand observations. This represents a reduction in
the sample of close to 70%. Similarly, for black men and black women, our sample
size is 2-3 thousand for the occupation-by-state sample, as compared to 600-900 state-
by-county pairs in the border discontinuity design. This represents a reduction in
sample size that is also close to 70%. In percentage terms the loss in sample size is
the same for both black and white workers.
A few important differences emerge between the results in which we exploit
the state variation as opposed to the results in which we exploit the border county
variation. First, we find that the labor supply effect for white men with ordinary
licenses is twice as large in the boundary discontinuity sample (Table E10). Likewise,
the magnitude of the labor supply effects for both white women and black women
increase markedly from -3% and -6% (respectively) to -27% and -22%. In contrast to
the increases in the negative labor supply responses that we document for white men,
white women, and black women, we find that under the boundary discontinuity design
that there is no negative labor supply effect of licensing on black men. The point
estimate goes from a statistically significant -19% in the state sample to a small and
statistically insignificant +9.0%. In Table E11 we also find that the felony restrictions
depress the labor supply by a marginally significant 12.4% for white men and a
statistically insignificant 12.4% for black men. This suggest that felony restrictions
have a deferentially more negative effect on the employment of white men than that
of black men, which would be consistent with black men using the license as a signal
of non-felony status.
Among the other license attributes, we find a statistically significant positive
effect of training duration longer than 1 month on the labor supply of black women
68
and white men but a negative effect of training duration on the labor supply of black
men. Moreover, we find a positive and statistically significant effect of continuous
education on the labor supply of black men and a negative and statistically significant
effect of felony restrictions on the labor supply of black women. What we can say
unambiguously is that licensing reduces the labor supply of white men and white
women. We have weaker evidence that licensing reduces the labor supply of black men
and black women because both the state level estimates and the estimates from the
border discontinuity design generate statistically insignificant effects of occupational
licensing on employment or black workers.
3.4 Robustness Checks
The robustness tests for our results center on checking whether our parameter
estimates are sensitive to the choice of the reference occupation, the way in which we
define our licensing variable, and the year in which our regression is estimated.
First, in the main analysis, we choose ‘Elementary and middle school teachers’
as the reference group. To ensure that our estimates do not depend on the choice of
this reference group, we estimate our model using ‘Manager, all other’ as the leading
alternative, since this is a universally unlicensed occupation with good coverage across
all counties. Moreover, we also include results with three other occupations as the
reference occupation: 1) Financial Analyst 2) Auto Mechanic 3) Home and Health
Aid.7 For each choice of the reference occupation, we estimate equation (3.10), which
exploits boundary discontinuities, and present the results in Table E12. Indeed, we
find similar magnitudes as in the main analysis. Comparing the estimated licensing
parameters in the border samples for different choices of the reference occupations,
7We thank Morris Kleiner for suggesting these alternative choices for the reference occupation.
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we find that licensing reduces equilibrium relative employment by 28% – 30%. This
is to be expected because the parameter β is a deep parameter of the utility model.
The choice of the reference occupation only serves a technical purpose of allowing
us to estimate the model using a straightforward log-linear regression rather than a
maximum likelihood estimator.
Second, to check the sensitivity of our results to measurement error in the
licensing variable, as we have defined it, we use an alternative measure of whether
an occupation is licensed. The Employment and Training Administration of the U.S.
Department of Labor financially supports a website www.careeronestop.org, which
collects data from each state’s Labor Market Information unit for the purpose of
providing information to job seekers in an easy-to-access format. We scrape the
CareerOneStop website to record the name of each occupation in each state that
reports having a licensing agency. We report an occupation as having a license if it
has a licensing agency that appears in the CareerOneStop database. Gittleman and
Kleiner (2016) also use a similar strategy to define whether a 6-digit occupation is
partially licensed.8 As both CareerOneStop and the CPS define occupation using
the Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) system, we can match the license
requirement of an occupation at 6-digit level in March CPS directly. Focusing on the
boundary discontinuity design, again we find magnitudes between −29% to −31% in
Table E13 using this alternative measure of licensing. These estimates are similar to
the results in the main analysis.
Third, to test whether the magnitude of employment effects that we estimate
are stable over time, we re-estimate equation (3.10) using Basic Monthly Survey
of CPS in 2016 and 2017, with the licensing variable defined by whether the state-
8The authors thank Maury Gittleman and Morris Kleiner for putting this data source on our
radar.
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occupation pair appears in the CareerOneStop database. In Table E14 and Table E15
we see that the estimates of the employment effects of licensing are in the range
between −29% and −33%, which is broadly similar to the magnitudes that we found
using the 2015 CPS.
3.5 Conclusion
As expected by economic theory, we find evidence for a negative effect of
occupational licensing on labor supply. Surprisingly, we find that these negative labor
supply effects occur primarily for white workers. We find much weaker evidence
of licensing having a negative labor supply effect for black women and black men.
Moreover, although many licenses have additional requirements, we do not find strong
evidence that these requirements further distort the labor supply decision of workers
above and beyond the direct effect of the occupation being licensed.
71
Appendices
72
Appendix A Appendix of Chapter 1: Tables
Table A1: Sample characteristics do not vary after dropping observations
(1) (2) (3)
Traced Sample from Wave I Only connected students Network size between 11 and 400
mean sd mean sd mean sd
College Completion (Wave IV) 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48
Female 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50
Age 14.80 1.77 14.73 1.75 14.66 1.76
Black 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34
Other 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.38
Multiple Races 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09
Friend nominations 4.22 2.89 4.95 2.48 4.95 2.49
Family and community characteristics
Father with college degree 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.44 0.25 0.43
Father as Professional 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
Mother with college degree 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44
Mother as Professional 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45
Two-Parent Family 0.72 0.45 0.74 0.44 0.74 0.44
Race Dispersion (Block level) 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.21 0.23
Crime rate (county level) 5215.58 2784.61 5050.58 2739.44 5134.58 2765.12
Median income ($1, 000) (block level) 29.94 13.18 30.03 12.98 29.60 13.23
Observations 10,258 8,563 7,399
Note: This table shows that the sample characteristics do not change much with the two sample selection criterion. Apart from the outcome of interest ‘College
completion’, this table also shows all control variables that are included in the estimation. Especially, ‘Family and community characteristics’ are used to address
neighborhood sorting. The final sample consists of 7,399 students from 116 networks (schools). Cross-sectional weight in Wave IV applies.
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Table A2: Positive correlation between college graduation and friends’ family background
Male Female
With college No college t-stat. With college No college t-stat.
Family Background of friend
Friends’ Father (College) 0.3942 0.2081 -0.1861∗∗∗ 0.3475 0.1738 -0.1738∗∗∗
Friends’ Mother (College) 0.3835 0.2324 -0.1511∗∗∗ 0.3742 0.2051 -0.1691∗∗∗
Friends from two-parent family 0.8061 0.7117 -0.0944∗∗∗ 0.7723 0.6879 -0.0844∗∗∗
Characteristics of friend
GPA 3.0624 2.7377 -0.3248∗∗∗ 3.0368 2.7226 -0.3142∗∗∗
Female 0.3920 0.3940 0.0021 0.6608 0.6733 0.0125∗
Age 15.0014 15.0090 0.0076 15.0415 15.0444 0.0029
Black 0.1292 0.1508 0.0215∗∗ 0.1907 0.2043 0.0136
Other races 0.2284 0.2621 0.0336∗∗∗ 0.2096 0.2551 0.0455∗∗∗
Observations 1296 2373 1977 2917
Note: This table compares the raw relationship between the characteristics of peers’ parents and college completion status of students. For both male
and female students with college degrees, their friends’ parents whom they met during Grade 7 to 12 tend to be better educated. For example, in the first
row, only 21% of their peers’ fathers went to college for males without degree, compared to 39% for males with degree.
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Table A3: Control variables reduce the size of the effects from peers’ parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Peers’ Father (College) 1.111*** 1.012*** 0.735*** 0.620*** 0.506*** 0.297***
(0.0642) (0.0694) (0.0726) (0.0741) (0.0808) (0.0863)
Peers’ Mother (College) 0.677*** 0.567*** 0.392*** 0.315*** 0.186** 0.118
(0.0633) (0.0675) (0.0702) (0.0711) (0.0780) (0.0793)
F-Stat of Difference 15.19*** 13.76*** 7.64*** 5.96** 5.73** 1.69
Constant -0.774*** -3.597*** -3.801*** -4.203*** -0.745 -1.230
(0.0233) (0.174) (0.182) (0.190) (0.637) (0.796)
Own Characteristics X X X X X
Family Background# X X X X
Neighborhood Characteristics X X X
Fixed Effect X X
Direct Peer Effect## X
Pseudo R2 0.0909 0.203 0.253 0.263 0.309 0.318
Observations 7,399 7,399 7,399 7,399 7,352 7,352
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.
Dependent variable in all regressions is college attainment of students. A network is defined as a school. Spillover from peers’ parents is
measured by the proportion of peers’ father/mother who are college-grad.
# Family background include occupation and education of father and mother, and a single parent indicator; neighborhood characteristics
include crime rate (county level), median household income (block level) and race dispersion (block level).
##Friendship links are directed without consensus. Direct peer effect is measured by the average characteristics (GPA, race, gender, age
and single parent status) of peers, and outdegree (by race).
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Table A4: Family background and direct peer effects explain away the opposite-gender spillover
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male: Peers’ Father (College) 1.154*** 1.063*** 0.826*** 0.713*** 0.646*** 0.460***
(0.0923) (0.103) (0.107) (0.108) (0.115) (0.120)
Male: Peers’ Mother (College) 0.370*** 0.383*** 0.168 0.0907 -0.0494 -0.142
(0.0920) (0.103) (0.107) (0.109) (0.117) (0.119)
F-Stat of Difference 21.66*** 14.17*** 12.30*** 10.79*** 12.13*** 8.81***
Female: Peers’ Father (College) 1.125*** 0.976*** 0.668*** 0.552*** 0.395*** 0.162
(0.0857) (0.0930) (0.0969) (0.0984) (0.106) (0.111)
Female: Peers’ Mother (College) 0.911*** 0.704*** 0.557*** 0.478*** 0.357*** 0.305***
(0.0817) (0.0893) (0.0922) (0.0930) (0.100) (0.101)
F-Stat of Difference 2.03 2.92* 0.46 0.20 0.04 0.64
Constant -0.780*** -3.545*** -3.750*** -4.153*** -0.629 -1.093
(0.0234) (0.176) (0.184) (0.191) (0.638) (0.797)
Own Characteristics X X X X X
Family Background# X X X X
Neighborhood Characteristics X X X
Fixed Effect X X
Direct Peer Effect## X
Observations 7,399 7,399 7,399 7,399 7,352 7,352
Pseudo R2 0.0956 0.203 0.254 0.264 0.310 0.319
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.
Dependent variable in all regressions is college attainment of students. A network is defined as a school. Spillover from peers’ parents is
measured by the proportion of peers’ father/mother who are college-grad.
# Family background include occupation and education of father and mother, and a single parent indicator; neighborhood characteristics
include crime rate (county level), median household income (block level) and race dispersion (block level).
##Friendship links are directed without consensus. Direct peer effect is measured by the average characteristics (GPA, race, gender, age
and single parent status) of peers, and outdegree (by race).
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Table A5: Influence from peers’ parents is smaller than peers and own parents
Own Parents Peers’ Parents
Marginal effect Marginal effect Normalized magnitude#
Father on Males 0.075*** 0.118*** 0.0236
(0.0167) (0.031)
Mother on Males 0.085*** -0.037 -0.0074
(0.0162) (0.031)
Father on Females 0.109*** 0.042 0.0084
(0.0154) (0.029)
Mother on Females 0.104*** 0.079*** 0.0158
(0.014) (0.026)
Peers’ GPA 0.065***
(0.011)
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.
# The magnitudes from peers’ parents are adjusted by a factor of 5 as the average number of friends in the
sample is 4.85.
The first panel compares the marginal effects from average college attainment of peers’ parents to own
parents. For a male student, the effect from having one more peers’ father with a college degree is one-third
of the effect from having a college-grad father. For a female student, the effect from having one more peers’
mother with a college degree is one-sixth of the effects from having a college-grad mother.
The second panel shows the marginal effects for average GPA of peers. The influences from peers’ parents of
same-gender are comparable to half of the effects from an increase in 1 standard deviation (0.55) in average
peers’ GPA.
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Table A6: Gender-specific effects remain robust after selection-correction
Exogenous link Endogenous link
d-dimensional latent factors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d = 1 d = 2 d = 3
Male: Peers’ Father (College) 0.467*** 0.470*** 0.460*** 0.466***
(0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.119)
Male: Peers’ Mother (College) -0.146 -0.147 -0.162 -0.159
(0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119)
Female: Peers’ Father (College) 0.165 0.164 0.151 0.163
(0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.111)
Female: Peers’ Mother (College) 0.307*** 0.310*** 0.305*** 0.299***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101)
Average GPA of Peers 0.255*** 0.254*** 0.238*** 0.238***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
ρ1 0.043** 0.063*** 0.069***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
ρ2 0.034** 0.027
(0.018) (0.021)
ρ3 0.023
(0.019)
Link formation
|genderi − genderj| -0.318*** -0.425*** -0.523***
(0.050) (0.042) (0.038)
|agei − agej| -0.184*** -0.236*** -0.322***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.030)
|gradei − gradej| -1.311*** -1.361*** -1.341***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.030)
AICM 7015.32 7012.1 7007.716 7008.21
Note: Variables in link formation equation also include i’s age, j’s age, and the d-dimensional latent factors. MCMC
estimation runs for 150,000 iterations with the first 40,000 iterations as burn-in. Standard deviation of the 110,000
posterior draws is in the corresponding parenthesis. Hypothesis testing is based on frequentist’s approach, where
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.
Sample size is 7,399. Dependent variable in all regressions is college attainment of students. All regressions include
standard demographic variables, controls for outdegree(by race), as well as grade and network fixed effects. Controls
of family background include occupation and education of father and mother, and a single parent indicator; com-
munity characteristics include crime rate (county level), median household income (block level) and race dispersion
(block level). A network is defined as a school. Spillover from peers’ parents is measured by the proportion of peers’
father/mother who are college-grad.
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Figure A1: The plots show the changes of the four main coefficients when adjusting
the weight (α) on non-reciprocal friendships. Error bar of each dot represents the 90%
confidence interval. When α approaches 0, less weights are assigned to non-reciprocal
links. When α = 0, all links are reciprocal friendships, whereas α = 1 resembles
the weight used in the main analysis. The estimates are indeed stable across the
weighting methods. One exception is the coefficient of the effects of peers’ father on
males (Top-left panel), when only reciprocal links are counted, the spillover become
small and insignificant.
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Table A7: Heterogeneity by family background (Linear Probability Model)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Two-Parent family
VARIABLES Both college Either college Neither college Single FATHER Single MOTHER Both absence
Peers’ Fathers on Males 0.0813 0.207*** 0.167*** -0.00939 0.131* 0.0672
(0.0668) (0.0644) (0.0538) (0.133) (0.0703) (0.128)
Peers’ Mothers on Males -0.0575 -0.0826 0.0126 0.0519 0.0203 -0.112
(0.0668) (0.0637) (0.0529) (0.129) (0.0664) (0.135)
Peers’ Fathers on Females 0.0105 0.00529 0.0565 0.0863 0.219*** -0.187
(0.0608) (0.0640) (0.0462) (0.166) (0.0645) (0.173)
Peers’ Mothers on Females 0.0953 0.219*** 0.0546 0.302* 0.0466 -0.0288
(0.0594) (0.0609) (0.0437) (0.173) (0.0554) (0.141)
Observations 1,237 1,291 2,925 224 1,428 294
Note: This table shows the four variables of interest by student’s family background. All the variables are estimated by interacting
the four interest variables with indicators of family status in one regression with all the control variables included in the main analysis.
A linear probability model is employed for the ease of interpretation.
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Table A8: Summary Statistics of the Measures on Parental Care (Two-parent family)
mean sd min max
Survey Question
Feel close to mother? 4.470933 .903511 1 5
Mother cares about you? 4.796809 .7074782 1 5
Feel close to father? 3.927013 1.356822 1 5
Father cares about you? 4.362003 1.305317 1 5
Care Index
Index on both father and mother .327315 .7712555 -2.44633 .9060649
Index on mother .082181 .7195385 -3.469914 .4276676
Index on father .3226724 .7387105 -1.484134 .81809
The sample size for two-parent families is 5,453. The responses are recorded in the Wave 1 In-Home survey
of AddHealth.
The care indexes are obtained using the principal-factor method.
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Table A9: Spillover from Peers’ Parents Diminishes With Care From Own Father
Two-Parent Family
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Care from both Care from mom Care from dad
Peers’ Fathers on Males 0.187*** 0.146*** 0.189***
(0.0435) (0.0385) (0.0435)
Peers’ Mothers on Males -0.0506 -0.0443 -0.0458
(0.0409) (0.0371) (0.0409)
Peers’ Fathers on Females 0.0253 0.0226 0.0282
(0.0366) (0.0349) (0.0367)
Peers’ Mothers on Females 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.114***
(0.0333) (0.0324) (0.0333)
CareIndex 0.0586*** 0.00998 0.0546***
(0.0147) (0.0108) (0.0151)
CareIndex*(Peers’ Fathers on Males) -0.0972** -0.0260 -0.102**
(0.0482) (0.0502) (0.0499)
CareIndex*(Peers’ Mothers on Males) 0.0318 0.0450 0.0178
(0.0462) (0.0487) (0.0472)
CareIndex*(Peers’ Fathers on Females) -0.00669 0.0350 -0.0137
(0.0409) (0.0470) (0.0425)
CareIndex*(Peers’ Mothers on Females) -0.0216 -0.0104 -0.0229
(0.0383) (0.0473) (0.0394)
Constant -0.254 -0.192 -0.248
(0.324) (0.324) (0.325)
Observations 5,453 5,453 5,453
R-squared 0.373 0.371 0.372
# Four measures about parental cares are obtained from “How close do you feel to your mother/father?”
and “How much do you think she/he cares about you?”. The responses are recorded in the Wave 1 In-Home
survey of AddHealth. ‘CareIndex’ is obtained by analyzing the correlation matrix of the measures using the
principal-factor method. The ‘CareIndex’ in Coumn 1 is obtained using all the four measures, whereas that
in Column 2 and 3 are obtained using mother(father)-specific measures.
Note: A linear probability model is employed. The sample is constrained to two-parent families because
responses are skipped for students from single parent families.
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Table A10: Correlation matrix of college completion and other outcomes
college GPA smoke drunk danger
college 1.000
GPA 0.409 1.000
smoke -0.168 -0.193 1.000
drunk -0.085 -0.140 0.468 1.00
danger -0.061 -0.057 0.227 0.213 1.00
Data source: ‘Smoke, ‘drunk’, and ‘danger’ are dummy variable obtained
from the three questions “During the past twelve months, how often did you”
separately on ‘smoking cigarettes’, ‘get drunk’, and ‘do something dangerous
because you were dared to’ in the In-School survey of AddHealth.
The table shows that negative behaviors are not strongly correlated with
college attainment. Regressing these other outcomes on the average college
attainment of peers’ parents can test the hypothesis that behavioral change
is one mechanism.
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Table A11: Education background of peers’ parents does not affect negative behaviors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GPA GPA smoke smoke drunk drunk danger danger
Homogeneous effect
Peers’ Father (College) 0.0970** -0.0160 0.000718 -0.00781
(0.0395) (0.0262) (0.0240) (0.0281)
Peers’ Mother (College) 0.0634* 0.00849 0.00412 -0.0290
(0.0358) (0.0239) (0.0219) (0.0255)
Heterogeneous effect
Male: Peers’ Father (College) 0.152*** -0.0395 -0.0479 -0.0558
(0.0537) (0.0354) (0.0327) (0.0383)
Male: Peers’ Mother (College) -0.0240 0.0226 0.0142 -0.0416
(0.0521) (0.0345) (0.0318) (0.0372)
Female: Peers’ Father (College) 0.0506 0.0253 0.0537* 0.0416
(0.0506) (0.0331) (0.0306) (0.0359)
Female: Peers’ Mother (College) 0.131*** 0.00675 4.65e-05 -0.0181
(0.0463) (0.0305) (0.0281) (0.0330)
Spillover effect 0.436*** 0.436*** 0.411*** 0.392*** 0.439*** 0.428*** 0.165*** 0.162***
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0217) (0.0217)
Constant 3.500*** 3.545*** -0.119 0.226 -0.109 0.0746 0.664** 0.816***
(0.430) (0.430) (0.283) (0.282) (0.260) (0.260) (0.304) (0.305)
Observations 7,399 7,399 6,985 6,985 6,985 6,985 6,985 6,985
R-squared 0.279 0.279 0.173 0.193 0.225 0.231 0.105 0.109
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.
A simple model without friendship formation is used for all regressions. For dichotomous outcomes from Column (3) to (8), a linear probability model is
employed.
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Appendix B Appendix of Chapter 1: MCMC Al-
gorithm
Define Y be the outcome variable, X and Z be the observed characteristics in
outcome and network equation respectively, and ξ be the d-dimensional latent factors.
Di represents all observed links of student i. Let also Θ be the set of all parameters.
The likelihood function for each school g is then:
L(Ys, Ds|Xs, Zs, ξs; Θ) =
∫
ξs
P (Y ∗s , Ds|Xs, Zs, ξs; Θ)f(ξs)dξs
=
∫
ξs
P (Y ∗s |Ds, Xs, ξs; Θ, αs)P (Ds|Zs, ξs; Θ)f(ξs)dξs (11)
The estimation of the above likelihood function procedure closely follows (Hsieh and
Lee, 2016), which Metropolis-Hasting (M-H) algorithm is incorporated in Gibbs sam-
pling.
Let y∗i be agent i’s latent variable of the outcome equation and follows normal distri-
bution. The subscript for each school s is dropped unless specified. For clarity, let
β = {β, δ, φ} and θ = {β, α, ρ, γ}.
The prior distributions of the parameters and the unobserved latent factors
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are defined as:
ξi ∼ Nd(0, Id)
γ ∼ Nq(γ0,Γ0)
β ∼ Nk(β0, B0)
ρd ∼ Nd(ρ0, σd0)
αg ∼ N(a0, A0)
For each iteration, we draw a new set of values for the parameters according
to the following procedures:
Latent variable: The full conditional of y∗|θ, Z, Y,X,W is a truncated normal
distribution, that is
P (y∗(t)|θ(t−1), ξ(t−1), Y,X,W ) = 1(Yi = 1)1(y∗i > 0) + 1(Yi = 0)1(y∗i ≤ 0)
Sample {y∗(t)i } from the aforementioned posterior distribution.
Unobserved ξ: Sample {ξ(t)i } from P (ξ(t)|y∗(t), θ(t−1), Y,X,W ) with M-H, where
P (ξ(t)|y∗(t), θ(t−1), Y,X,W ) ∝ N(ξ; 0, I)P (y∗|W, ξ; θ(t−1))P (W |ξ, γ(t−1))
This procedure is repeated for each network independently. Adaptive updating is
employed to achieve the optimal acceptance rate between 20% and 30%.
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Link formation: Sample γ from P (γ|W, {ξ(t)}) with M-H, where
P (γ|W, {ξ(t)}) ∝ Nq+2(γ; γ0, G0)P (W |ξ(t)i , ξ(t)j , γ)
Outcome parameters: Sample β from P (β|y∗(t),W,X, ξ(t); ρ(t−1), α(t−1)), where
P (β|y∗(t),W, ξ(t); ρ(t−1), α(t−1)) ∝ N(θ0, Q0)P (y∗|W,X, ξ(t); ρ(t−1), α(t−1),β)
∝ Nk(M,B)
with M = B(Q−10 θ0 +X
′(y∗ − ξρ− lα)) and B = (B−10 +X ′X)−1.
Error correction: Sample ρ from P (ρ|y∗(t),W,X, ξ(t);β(t), α(t−1)) with M-H, where
P (ρ|y∗(t),W,X, ξ(t);β(t), α(t−1)) ∝ N(ρ0, σ0)P (y∗|W,X, ξ(t);β(t), α(t−1), ρ)
Group effects: Sample αg from P (αg|y∗(t)g ,Wg, X, ξ(t)g }; β(t), ρ(t)), where
P (αg|y∗(t)g ,Wg, X, ξ(t)g };β(t), ρ(t)) ∝ N(α0, A0)P (y∗g |Wg, Xg, ξ(t)g ;β(t), ρ(t), αg)
∝ N(αˆg, Rg)
with αˆg = Rg(A
−1
0 α0 + l
′
g(y
∗
g −Xgβ − ξgρ)) and Rg = (A−10 + l′glg)−1
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Appendix C Appendix of Chapter 1: Convergence
Diagnosis
Figure C1: The figures show the chain values of the four variables of interest. Conver-
gence is confirmed by Geweke (1992)’s diagnostic that mimics a simple two-sample
test of means between the first 10% and the last 50% of the chain values.
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Figure C2: The figures show the histograms of the draws of the four variables.
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Appendix D Appendix of Chapter 2
Table D1: First stage result for different instruments
(1) (2) (3)
Main IV # IV2 # IV3
IV 0.699*** 0.683*** -0.0139***
(0.0185) (0.0194) (0.00109)
black -0.0381*** -0.0385*** -0.0397***
(0.00426) (0.00427) (0.00429)
female 0.000567 0.000442 8.82e-06
(0.00325) (0.00326) (0.00328)
Constant -0.195*** -0.197*** 1.020***
(0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0955)
Observations 68,012 68,012 68,260
R-squared 0.303 0.301 0.290
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Dependent variable is the likelihood of having a li-
cense. All regressions include a quadratic in age, education
levels, union status, a government worker indicator, a female
indicator, a black indicator, a self-employed indicator, a large-
company indicator as well as state, month and 3-digit occupa-
tion fixed effects. # Occupations with less than 10 observations
are dropped to avoid sensitivity in computation.
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Table D2: Unconditional License Premium
OLS 2SLS#
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
license 0.237*** 0.0716*** 0.0776*** 0.0744*** 0.422***
(0.00542) (0.00492) (0.00487) (0.00494) (0.0357)
black -0.195*** -0.133*** -0.139*** -0.0736*** -0.0590***
(0.00673) (0.00587) (0.00602) (0.00555) (0.00592)
female -0.210*** -0.230*** -0.229*** -0.168*** -0.168***
(0.00457) (0.00398) (0.00393) (0.00423) (0.00439)
Constant 2.989*** 1.398*** 1.304*** 1.651*** 1.710***
(0.00949) (0.0236) (0.0286) (0.0274) (0.0290)
First Stage F 1428
Observations 68,260 68,260 68,260 68,260 68,012
R-squared 0.066 0.299 0.320 0.444 0.403
Control+ X X X X
State X X X
3-digit Occupation X X
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the implied hourly wage. The sample is restricted to
respondents aged 18-64 with hourly wages on the main job between $5 and $100 from May through
November in 2012. Ethnicity other than Whites and Blacks are excluded. All regressions include
month fixed effects.
# The instrument is out-state fraction of licensed workers in an occupation. Occupations with less
than 10 observations are dropped to avoid sensitivity of computation.
+ Controls include a quadratic in age, education levels, union status, a government worker indicator,
a self-employed indicator, and a large-company indicator.
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Table D3: Unconditional License Premium for different IV measures
2SLS
OLS Main IV # IV2 # IV3
license 0.0744*** 0.422*** 0.413*** 0.672***
(0.00494) (0.0357) (0.0381) (0.112)
black -0.0736*** -0.0590*** -0.0593*** -0.0497***
(0.00555) (0.00592) (0.00593) (0.00757)
female -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.167***
(0.00423) (0.00439) (0.00438) (0.00466)
Constant 1.651*** 1.710*** 1.708*** 1.747***
(0.0274) (0.0290) (0.0291) (0.0351)
First Stage F 1428 1245 160.6
Observations 68,260 68,012 68,012 68,260
R-squared 0.444 0.403 0.405 0.324
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the implied hourly wage. The sample
is restricted to respondents aged 18-64 with hourly wages on the main job
between $5 and $100 from May through November in 2012. Ethnicity other
than Whites and Blacks are excluded. All regressions include a quadratic in
age, education levels, union status, a government worker indicator, a female
indicator, a self-employed indicator, a large-company indicator as well as state,
month and 3-digit occupation fixed effects .
# Occupations with less than 10 observations are dropped to avoid sensitivity
of computation.
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Table D4: Conditional License Premium
2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Main IV # IV2# IV3
license 0.0307*** 0.370*** 0.362*** 0.617***
(0.00702) (0.0358) (0.0382) (0.103)
black -0.133*** -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.145***
(0.00876) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0118)
female -0.194*** -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.195***
(0.00491) (0.00613) (0.00615) (0.00623)
license*black 0.120*** 0.213*** 0.209*** 0.157***
(0.0225) (0.0466) (0.0469) (0.0482)
license*female 0.0789*** 0.0984*** 0.0974*** 0.0814***
(0.00933) (0.0192) (0.0193) (0.0199)
black*female 0.0988*** 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.119***
(0.0117) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0154)
license*black*female -0.153*** -0.298*** -0.294*** -0.233***
(0.0279) (0.0547) (0.0550) (0.0561)
Constant 1.656*** 1.725*** 1.724*** 1.761***
(0.0266) (0.0282) (0.0283) (0.0323)
First Stage F 1433 1248 161.1
Observations 68,260 68,012 68,012 68,260
R-squared 0.445 0.444 0.444 0.443
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the implied hourly wage. The sample is
restricted to respondents aged 18-64 with hourly wages on the main job between $5
and $100 from May through November in 2012. Ethnicity other than Whites and
Blacks are excluded. All regressions include a quadratic in age, education levels, union
status, a government worker indicator, a self-employed indicator, a large-company
indicator as well as state and 3-digit occupation fixed effects .
# Occupations with less than 10 observations are dropped to avoid sensitivity of
computation.
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Table D5: License premiums and the wage gaps
Panel A: Bias of License premiums
OLS Main IV Bias
White Man 0.031
(0.007)
∗∗∗ 0.369
(0.035)
∗∗∗ -0.338
Black Man 0.120
(0.023)
∗∗∗ 0.583
(0.055)
∗∗∗ -0.463
White Woman 0.079
(0.009)
∗∗∗ 0.469
(0.036)
∗∗∗ -0.390
Black Woman 0.076
(0.016)
∗∗∗ 0.384
(0.044)
∗∗∗ -0.308
Panel B #: Wage gaps among unlicensed and licensed workers
OLS Main IV
Unlicensed Licensed Unlicensed Licensed
White Man 0 0 0 0
Black Man −0.133
(0.009)
∗∗∗ −0.013
(0.021)
−0.154
(0.011)
∗∗∗ 0.058
(0.0392)
White Woman −0.194
(0.005)
∗∗∗ −0.115
(0.009)
∗∗∗ −0.199
(0.012)
∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗
(0.016)
Black Woman −0.228
(0.008)
∗∗∗ −0.183
(0.015)
∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗
(0.011)
−0.221∗∗∗
(0.026)
Standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01: sum of coefficients significance
# Comparison is made between the earnings of white male and the earnings of
the race or gender in the corresponding row.
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Table D6: The Most Common Occupations
Occupation N Percent Licensed
Elementary and middle school teacher 2,143 75.69
Retail salespersons 17,55 8.21
Registered Nurses 17,36 81.62
Secretaries and administrative assistants 1,660 8.55
Cashiers 1,544 6.67
Manager, all other 1,391 14.23
Driver/sales workers and truck workers 1,390 37.91
First-line supervisors/managers of retail sales workers 1,185 7.68
Customer service representatives 1,133 9.89
Nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides 1,079 49.77
Source: Panel 2008 Wave 13, Survey of Income and Program Participation
Note: ‘N’ refers the total number of workers in that occupation. Credentials issued by private
agencies are dropped. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 18-64 with hourly wages on the
main job between $5 and $100 from May through November in 2012. Ethnicity other than Whites
and Blacks are excluded.
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Table D7: Burden of licensing by states
State Total variety Occupation(s) with the heaviest burden
Illinois 370 Buyers and Purchasing Agents, Farm Products
Maine 362 Registered Nurses
California 342 Insurance Sales Agents
Oregon 312 Electricians
Arkansas 277 Athletes, coaches, unpires, and related
Connecticut 272 Insurance Sales Agents/
Construction and Building Inspectors
Indiana 254 Water and Wastewater Treatment Plant and System Operators
Michigan 250 Postsecondary teachers/
Construction and Building Inspectors
Kentucky 231 Counselors/
Other health care practitioners
Wisconsin 230 Pipelayers/
Construction and Building Inspectors
Source: CareerOneStop (2015)
Note: The occupation is classified according to Census Occupation Code 2010.
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Table D8: States vary in excluding felons from licensure
State Number of mandatory felony restric-
tions in license applications
Most Restrictive
Texas 133
New Hampshire 128
Ohio 118
Florida 102
Indiana 102
Least restrictive
Wyoming 27
Massachusetts 26
North Dakota 24
Vermont 19
Hawaii 16
Source: Mulady (2016)
The mean number of mandatory restrictions is 59, standard deviation is 30.
97
Table D9: Licenses as a Screen for Felony Conviction
Unlicensed Licensed
(1) (2)
No. of restrictions (divided by 100) 0.0430 0.124*
(0.0420) (0.0700)
Constant -0.110*** -0.156***
(0.0318) (0.0533)
Observations 42 39
R-squared 0.025 0.079
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent variable is the adjusted racial wage gap of each state. The
regressions also include a dummy indicates states with observations less
than 100. + There is no observation which is black in some states.
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Table D10: Four questions in constructing the gender prejudice index
Abbreviation Question Scale
Agree Not
Sure
Disagree
FEHOME Do you agree or disagree with this state-
ment? Women should take care of run-
ning their homes and leave running the
country up to men.
2 0 -2
FEPOL Tell me if you agree or disagree with
this statement: Most men are better
suited emotionally for politics than are
most women.
2 0 -2
Approve Not
Sure
Disapprove
FEWORK Do you approve or disapprove of a mar-
ried woman earning money in business
or industry if she has a husband capable
of supporting her?
-2 0 2
Vote Not
Sure
Don’t
vote
FRPRES If your party nominated a woman for
President, would you vote for her if she
were qualified for the job?
-2 0 2
Note: The questions were asked in 1974. 1975, 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, and from 1988 to
1998 consecutively. For each question, a normalized score is calculated using the mean and the standard
deviation of that question in 1977.
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Table D11: Estimated relationship between gender prejudice and gender pay gap
Unlicensed Licensed
PREJUDICE INDEX (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
marginal -0.173* -0.0122 0.0353 -0.0432
(0.0929) (0.172) (0.190) (0.352)
average -0.173** -0.164 0.0478 0.0779
(0.0790) (0.148) (0.158) (0.293)
Constant -0.242*** -0.191*** -0.195*** -0.110 -0.120*** -0.133
(0.0350) (0.00939) (0.0550) (0.0714) (0.0187) (0.113)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50
R-squared 0.067 0.091 0.091 0.001 0.002 0.002
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions are weighted by
the precision that takes into account each state has different sizes of observations. The marginal sexist is
calculated using the fraction of labor force that is women in each state. The mean of unlicensed gender wage
gap is -0.188, and standard deviation is 0.095; the mean of licensed gender wage gap is -0.160, and standard
deviation is 0.175
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Appendix E Appendix of Chapter 3
Table E1: Descriptive Statistics for Full & Border Samples
Full sample Border Sample
mean sd mean sd
license 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.41
License Attributes:
felony ban 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26
exam 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22
training 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23
continuing education 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20
train more than a month 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09
Demographic Variables:
hourly wage 22.60 14.24 23.99 15.13
female 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50
black 0.11 0.32 0.15 0.35
hispanic 0.14 0.35 0.20 0.40
age 41.09 12.64 40.75 12.58
college 0.36 0.48 0.41 0.49
government worker 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37
Observations 131,984 29,233
Data Source: The demographic variables are contained in 2015 Basic
Monthly Survey (CPS). Individuals in CPS are matched with the
licensing variables in the Panel 2008 (Wave 13) Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP) and the American Bar Association
(ABA) using the 50-50 rule.
In this table we report summary statistics for the licensing and demo-
graphic variables in our data for both the full sample and the border
sample.
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Table E2: Top 10 Occupations by County Coverage
Occupation # Counties
Elementary and middle school teachers 321
Registered nurses 315
Managers, all other 314
Secretaries and administrative assistants 314
First-line supervisors/managers of retail sales workers 312
Retail salespersons 309
Driver/sales workers and truck drivers 307
Cashiers 295
Customer service representatives 288
Janitors and building cleaners 284
Data Source: 2015 Basic Monthly Survey (CPS)
The table presents the 10 most common occupations in the sample, as measured by the number of
counties in which there is a non-zero number of workers in that occupation (6-digit SOC code). We
use this measure of county coverage to choose the reference occupation to be the occupation with
the most widespread county coverage – namely elementary and middle school teachers.
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Table E3: Top 10 Most Licensed Occupations
Occupation # Licensed States
Lawyers, Judges, magistrates, and other judicial workers 51
Elementary and middle school teachers 51
Registered nurses 51
Physicians and surgeons 51
Secondary school teachers 50
Nurse practitioners 49
Pharmacists 46
Physical therapists 44
Emergency medical technicians and paramedics 43
Special education teachers 43
Data Source: Licensing information of occupations are obtained from the Panel 2008 (Wave 13) Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) using the 50-50 rule.
The table presents the 10 most common licensed occupations in the sample.
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Table E4: Summary Statistics at State and County Level
States Border Counties
mean sd mean sd
share/share* 0.12 0.18 0.28 0.32
wage/wage* 0.93 0.44 0.89 0.44
license 0.15 0.35 0.20 0.40
ban 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.23
exam 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.22
continuing education 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.19
training 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.22
acquisition more than a month 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10
Observations 16,491 12,561
Data Source: The market share and wage of an occupation are computed using the demo-
graphic variables in 2015 Basic Monthly Survey (CPS). Licensing variables of occupations
are obtained from the Panel 2008 (Wave 13) Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) and the American Bar Association (ABA) using the 50-50 rule.
In this table we provide summary statistics of the key variables in our occupational
choice model at both the state and the county level (border counties only). The variable
‘share/‘share∗’ refers to the relative labor market share. The ‘share’ represents the labor
market share of occupations o in state s and ‘share∗’ represents the share of the reference
group ‘Elementary and middle school teachers’. Similarly, ‘wage/‘wage∗’, refers to the wage
relative to the wage in the reference occupation.
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Table E5: Baseline Model (Full sample)
(1) (2)
log(wage/wage*) 0.133*** 0.209***
(0.0199) (0.0148)
lightgray license -0.193*** -0.176***
lightgray (0.0257) (0.0182)
Constant -2.760*** -1.346***
(0.0105) (0.0858)
Occupation fixed effects X
Observations 16,491 16,491
R-squared 0.005 0.724
Data Source: The market share and wage of an occu-
pation are computed using the demographic variables
in 2015 Basic Monthly Survey (CPS). Licensing vari-
ables of occupations are obtained from the Panel 2008
(Wave 13) Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) and the American Bar Association (ABA) using
the 50-50 rule.
The dependent variable is the log of relative market share
in the state. The variable ‘license’ is a 0/1 dummy. The
reference occupation is ‘Elementary and middle school
teachers’ and occupation fixed effects are at the 6-digit
level. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table E6: Labor Supply Effect of Licensing using State Variation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(wage/wage*) 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.209***
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148)
lightgray license -0.176*** -0.179*** -0.190*** -0.194*** -0.187*** -0.174*** -0.192***
lightgray (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0183) (0.0187)
ban 0.100* -0.00552
(0.0602) (0.0661)
exam 0.119*** -0.142
(0.0354) (0.111)
training 0.144*** 0.348***
(0.0351) (0.117)
continuing education 0.116*** -0.0378
(0.0374) (0.0735)
acquisition more than a month -0.0849 -0.198***
(0.0637) (0.0682)
Constant -1.346*** -1.346*** -1.346*** -1.346*** -1.346*** -1.346*** -1.346***
(0.0858) (0.0858) (0.0858) (0.0858) (0.0858) (0.0858) (0.0858)
Observations 16,491 16,491 16,491 16,491 16,491 16,491 16,491
R-squared 0.724 0.724 0.724 0.724 0.724 0.724 0.725
Data Source: The market share and wage of an occupation are computed using the demographic variables in 2015 Basic Monthly
Survey (CPS). Licensing variables of occupations are obtained from the Panel 2008 (Wave 13) Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) and the American Bar Association (ABA) using the 50-50 rule.
Dependent variable is the log of relative market share. All license variables are 0/1 dummies. The reference occupation is ‘Elementary
and middle school teachers.’ All regressions include 6-digit occupation fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table E7: Labor Supply Effect of Licensing using Border Discontinuity Design
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(wage/wage*) 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.156***
(0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220)
lightgray license -0.275*** -0.272*** -0.263*** -0.252*** -0.257*** -0.274*** -0.254***
lightgray (0.0352) (0.0362) (0.0393) (0.0397) (0.0381) (0.0359) (0.0397)
ban -0.0398 0.00859
(0.108) (0.116)
exam -0.0429 0.305
(0.0636) (0.200)
training -0.0773 -0.341
(0.0633) (0.221)
continuing education -0.0811 -0.0447
(0.0672) (0.120)
train more than a month -0.0157 0.0447
(0.110) (0.118)
Constant -1.524*** -1.524*** -1.524*** -1.524*** -1.524*** -1.524*** -1.521***
(0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138)
Observations 6,433 6,433 6,433 6,433 6,433 6,433 6,433
R-squared 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711
Data Source: The market share and wage of an occupation are computed using the demographic variables in 2015 Basic Monthly
Survey (CPS). Licensing variables of occupations are obtained from the Panel 2008 (Wave 13) Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) and the American Bar Association (ABA) using the 50-50 rule.
Dependent variable is the log of relative market share. All license variables are 0/1 dummies. The reference occupation is
‘Elementary and middle school teachers.’ All regressions include 6-digit occupation fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
107
Table E8: Licensing Impacts by Race and Gender (State-level estimates)
White Male Black Male White Woman Black Woman
log(wage/wage*) 0.144*** 0.0149 0.135*** -0.00998
(0.0178) (0.0347) (0.0179) (0.0410)
lightgray license -0.152*** -0.189** -0.0274 -0.0587
lightgray (0.0264) (0.0823) (0.0239) (0.0775)
Constant 0.181* -0.451* -2.220*** -1.997***
(0.107) (0.239) (0.0882) (0.347)
Observations 11,991 2,250 9,819 2,864
R-squared 0.528 0.385 0.672 0.421
Data Source: The market share and wage of an occupation are computed using the demo-
graphic variables in 2015 Basic Monthly Survey (CPS). Licensing variables of occupations
are obtained from the Panel 2008 (Wave 13) Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) using the 50-50 rule. The dependent variable is the log of relative market share.
The variable ‘license’ is a 0/1 dummy. The reference occupation is ‘Elementary and middle
school teachers.’ All regressions include 6-digit occupation fixed effects.
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Table E9: Effect of Licensing Requirements by Race and Gender (State Sample)
White Male Black Male White Woman Black Woman
log(wage/wage*) 0.144*** 0.0159 0.135*** -0.00920
(0.0179) (0.0348) (0.0179) (0.0411)
lightgray license -0.151*** -0.190** -0.0341 -0.0621
lightgray (0.0272) (0.0883) (0.0247) (0.0844)
ban 0.117 -0.144 -0.0185 0.0478
(0.0872) (0.191) (0.0668) (0.155)
exam -0.138 0.0552 -0.0710 0.112
(0.162) (0.438) (0.114) (0.289)
training 0.153 -0.0461 0.202* -0.220
(0.173) (0.439) (0.121) (0.301)
continuing education -0.0317 0.0896 -0.0521 0.179
(0.103) (0.216) (0.0751) (0.170)
acquisition more than a month -0.151 -0.214 -0.219*** -0.0785
(0.103) (0.342) (0.0753) (0.212)
Constant 0.181* -0.451* -2.223*** -1.998***
(0.107) (0.239) (0.0882) (0.347)
Observations 11,991 2,250 9,819 2,864
R-squared 0.528 0.386 0.672 0.421
Data Source: The market share and wage of an occupation are computed using the demographic variables in
2015 Basic Monthly Survey (CPS). Licensing variables of occupations are obtained from the Panel 2008 (Wave
13) Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the American Bar Association (ABA) using the
50-50 rule.
The dependent variable is the log of the occupation’s relative market share in the state. All license variables
are 0/1 dummies. The reference occupation is ‘Elementary and middle school teachers.’ All regressions include
6-digit occupation fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table E10: Effect of Licensing by Race and Gender (Border Sample)
White Male Black Male White Woman Black Woman
log(wage/wage*) 0.101*** 0.122* 0.123*** 0.0233
(0.0238) (0.0670) (0.0268) (0.0534)
lightgraylicense -0.353*** 0.0879 -0.270*** -0.215***
lightgray (0.0339) (0.0957) (0.0353) (0.0687)
Constant 2.017*** 0.212 -1.976*** -2.510***
(0.134) (0.300) (0.163) (0.372)
Observations 3,625 593 3,280 886
R-squared 0.736 0.790 0.750 0.817
Data Source: The market share and wage of an occupation are computed using the demo-
graphic variables in 2015 Basic Monthly Survey (CPS). Licensing variables of occupations
are obtained from the Panel 2008 (Wave 13) Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) using the 50-50 rule.
The dependent variable is the log of the occupation’s relative market share in the county.
All license variables are 0/1 dummies. The reference occupation is ‘Elementary and middle
school teachers.’ All regressions include 6-digit occupation fixed effects. Standard errors in
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table E11: Effect of Licensing Requirements by Race and Gender (Border Sample)
White Male Black Male White Woman Black Woman
log(wage/wage*) 0.0998*** 0.144** 0.123*** 0.0203
(0.0238) (0.0675) (0.0268) (0.0534)
lightgraylicense -0.335*** 0.00517 -0.278*** -0.153*
lightgray (0.0381) (0.113) (0.0411) (0.0817)
ban -0.124* -0.124 0.000544 -0.236**
(0.0658) (0.158) (0.0612) (0.106)
exam 0.407 -0.396 -0.187 -0.234
(0.281) (0.389) (0.158) (0.286)
training -0.295 0.187 0.0452 0.291
(0.273) (0.346) (0.168) (0.336)
continuous education -0.157 0.884** 0.169 -0.0741
(0.139) (0.387) (0.104) (0.202)
train more than a month 0.256** -0.854* 0.149 0.512**
(0.129) (0.510) (0.100) (0.228)
Constant 2.030*** 0.210 -1.984*** -2.516***
(0.134) (0.299) (0.163) (0.371)
Observations 3,625 593 3,280 886
R-squared 0.736 0.795 0.751 0.820
Data Source: The market share and wage of an occupation are computed using the demographic variables
in 2015 Basic Monthly Survey (CPS). Licensing variables of occupations are obtained from the Panel
2008 (Wave 13) Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the American Bar Association
(ABA) using the 50-50 rule.
Dependent variable is the log of the occupation’s relative market share in the county. All license variables
are 0/1 dummies. The reference occupation is ‘Elementary and middle school teachers.’ All regressions
include 6-digit occupation fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
111
Table E12: Licensing Effects by Reference Occupation (Border sample)
Manager Financial Analyst Auto Mechanic Home Health Aides
log(wage/wage*) 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.118*** 0.102***
(0.0210) (0.0237) (0.0220) (0.0214)
lightgray license -0.279*** -0.280*** -0.301*** -0.275***
lightgray (0.0380) (0.0429) (0.0400) (0.0390)
ban -0.00178 0.0658 0.0155 0.0113
(0.109) (0.127) (0.115) (0.115)
exam 0.264 0.272 0.151 0.322*
(0.183) (0.202) (0.191) (0.185)
training -0.280 -0.271 -0.146 -0.316
(0.199) (0.226) (0.211) (0.202)
continuing education -0.0878 -0.0838 -0.0824 -0.103
(0.111) (0.128) (0.115) (0.115)
train more than a month 0.0769 0.145 0.0460 0.0708
(0.112) (0.126) (0.117) (0.116)
Constant -1.916*** 1.632*** 1.463*** 0.432***
(0.132) (0.142) (0.134) (0.135)
Observations 6,433 5,284 5,996 6,374
R-squared 0.772 0.774 0.762 0.750
Data Source: The market share and wage of an occupation are computed using the demographic variables in
2015 Basic Monthly Survey (CPS). Licensing variables of occupations are obtained from the Panel 2008 (Wave
13) Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the American Bar Association (ABA) using the
50-50 rule.
The dependent variable is the log of relative market share in the county. All license variables are 0/1 dummies.
All regressions include 6-digit occupation fixed effects. We estimate the effects of licensing using the following
occupations as the reference occupation: Manager (11-9199), Financial Analyst (13-2051), Auto-mechanics
(49-3023), and Home Health Aides (31-1010). Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table E13: Addressing Measurement Error by using License Variables from CareerOneStop (Border Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(wage/wage*) 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150***
(0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219)
lightgray license -0.312*** -0.297*** -0.304*** -0.301*** -0.303*** -0.312*** -0.288***
lightgray (0.0298) (0.0322) (0.0320) (0.0321) (0.0312) (0.0302) (0.0343)
ban -0.0681 -0.0673
(0.0595) (0.0597)
exam -0.0393 0.205
(0.0571) (0.238)
training -0.0518 -0.230
(0.0570) (0.247)
continuing education -0.0596 -0.0431
(0.0634) (0.108)
train more than a month 0.00131 0.0558
(0.0944) (0.103)
Constant -1.484*** -1.484*** -1.484*** -1.484*** -1.483*** -1.484*** -1.480***
(0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138)
Observations 6,433 6,433 6,433 6,433 6,433 6,433 6,433
R-squared 0.713 0.713 0.713 0.713 0.713 0.713 0.713
Data Source: The market share and wage of an occupation are computed using the demographic variables in 2015 Basic Monthly
Survey (CPS). The “license” dummy is obtained from CareerOneStop. Other licensing variables of occupations are obtained from
the Panel 2008 (Wave 13) Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the American Bar Association (ABA) using
the 50-50 rule.
The dependent variable is the log of the occupation’s relative market share in the county. All license variables are 0/1 dummies. The
reference occupation is ‘Elementary and middle school teachers.’ All regressions include 6-digit occupation fixed effects. Standard
errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table E14: Effects of Licensing on Labor Supply using CPS 2016 (Border Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(wage/wage*) 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.112***
(0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0218)
lightgray license -0.319*** -0.321*** -0.321*** -0.316*** -0.326*** -0.320*** -0.322***
lightgray (0.0299) (0.0324) (0.0323) (0.0322) (0.0313) (0.0302) (0.0346)
ban 0.00903 0.0147
(0.0573) (0.0579)
exam 0.00899 0.164
(0.0550) (0.168)
training -0.0126 -0.256
(0.0551) (0.175)
continuing education 0.0446 0.124
(0.0624) (0.101)
train more than a month 0.0181 0.0142
(0.0957) (0.107)
Constant -3.176*** -3.176*** -3.176*** -3.176*** -3.176*** -3.176*** -3.178***
(0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.136)
Observations 6,515 6,515 6,515 6,515 6,515 6,515 6,515
R-squared 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.745
Data Source: The market share and wage of an occupation are computed using the demographic variables in 2016 Basic Monthly
Survey (CPS). The “license” dummy is obtained from CareerOneStop. Other licensing variables of occupations are obtained from
the Panel 2008 (Wave 13) Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the American Bar Association (ABA) using
the 50-50 rule.
The dependent variable is the log of the occupation’s relative market share in the county. All license variables are 0/1 dummies. The
reference occupation is ‘Elementary and middle school teachers.’ All regressions include 6-digit occupation fixed effects. Standard
errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table E15: Effects of Licensing on Labor Supply using CPS 2017 (Border Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(wage/wage*) 0.0876*** 0.0868*** 0.0878*** 0.0880*** 0.0878*** 0.0876*** 0.0872***
(0.0216) (0.0215) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0215)
lightgray license -0.326*** -0.289*** -0.311*** -0.310*** -0.313*** -0.331*** -0.273***
lightgray (0.0304) (0.0332) (0.0325) (0.0326) (0.0318) (0.0308) (0.0351)
ban -0.156*** -0.163***
(0.0550) (0.0553)
exam -0.0719 0.00922
(0.0549) (0.191)
training -0.0746 -0.0589
(0.0543) (0.205)
continuing education -0.0884 -0.0783
(0.0601) (0.106)
train more than a month 0.0837 0.165*
(0.0888) (0.0966)
Constant -2.096*** -2.094*** -2.097*** -2.097*** -2.095*** -2.095*** -2.093***
(0.133) (0.132) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.132)
Observations 6,531 6,531 6,531 6,531 6,531 6,531 6,531
R-squared 0.735 0.735 0.735 0.735 0.735 0.735 0.735
Data Source: The market share and wage of an occupation are computed using the demographic variables in 2017 Basic Monthly
Survey (CPS). The “license” dummy is obtained from CareerOneStop. Other licensing variables of occupations are obtained from
the Panel 2008 (Wave 13) Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the American Bar Association (ABA) using
the 50-50 rule.
The dependent variable is the log of the occupation’s relative market share in the county. All license variables are 0/1 dummies. The
reference occupation is ‘Elementary and middle school teachers.’ All regressions include 6-digit occupation fixed effects. Standard
errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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